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AN EXAMINATION OF THE COHERENCE OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Nicholas Kahn-Fogel*
For decades, scholars have routinely attacked the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as an incoherent mess, impossible for
lower courts to follow. These scholars have based their claims almost
entirely on qualitative analysis of the Court’s opinions. This Article
presents the first systematic evaluation of the consensus view of Fourth
Amendment law as incoherent. The primary method I use to evaluate the
coherence of the body of law is an assessment of lower court performance on Fourth Amendment issues the Supreme Court would later resolve. Because the Supreme Court’s agreement with lower courts likely
reflects, at least in part, the clarity of the Supreme Court’s previous pronouncements, a high rate of agreement between lower courts and the
Supreme Court would tend to suggest the coherence of the field. On the
other hand, if the Court concludes most lower courts got the wrong answer to a Fourth Amendment question, that conclusion suggests either a
lack of clarity in the Court’s precedent or that the Court simply shifted
course after having issued seemingly straightforward pronouncements in
the past. Either of these possibilities would suggest a kind of incoherence
or instability in Fourth Amendment law. I examine lower court decisions
dealing with issues the Supreme Court subsequently addressed over the
course of twenty Supreme Court terms. Because Supreme Court cases
tend to deal with the most difficult, divisive issues, I also compare the
frequency with which the Court has felt compelled to review Fourth
Amendment questions to the rate at which the Court has dealt with other
important constitutional issues.
In addition to tracking the performance of lower courts, I track
variables that might impact the likelihood of lower courts reaching
“right” answers to Fourth Amendment questions. Because the process
the Court uses to resolve a case gives clues about the kind of guidance
the Court has previously provided on an issue, I account for whether the
Supreme Court used open-ended balancing or a more constrained form
of analogical reasoning from precedent to resolve each case in the data
* Assistant Professor, William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at
Little Rock. Thanks to Professors Rachel Best and Orin Kerr for insightful comments and
suggestions. I am grateful to Professor Jaxk Reeves and to Theresa Devasia for invaluable
assistance. Errors are mine. A research grant from the William H. Bowen School of Law
supported my work on this Article.
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set. I also assess whether the directive the Court issued for each case
took the form of a bright-line rule or an open-ended standard. Finally,
because several scholars have recommended reference to positive law as
a means of clarifying Fourth Amendment law, I evaluate the Court’s reliance on positive law to resolve Fourth Amendment questions during the
twenty-year period.
Ultimately, the results show that lower courts have reached the
“right” answers to Fourth Amendment questions about as often as lower
courts have reached the “right” answers to all questions the Supreme
Court later reviews. Furthermore, the Court has not felt compelled to
resolve Fourth Amendment questions at a rate that seems disproportionate to other important constitutional matters. These data point toward
the plausible conclusion that Fourth Amendment law is not particularly
incoherent, as compared with other areas of law. Examination of the
Court’s use of positive law reveals that the Court has, for the most part,
not relied on positive law in ways likely to enhance significantly the coherence of Fourth Amendment law. Thus, a more principled approach to
using positive law to resolve Fourth Amendment questions might increase the coherence of the field. Finally, analysis of the data suggests
the Court should issue directives in the form of bright-line rules instead
of open-ended standards if it hopes further to enhance the clarity of
Fourth Amendment law.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Case for Using Supreme Court Agreement with
Lower Courts as a Partial Proxy for Coherence in
Supreme Court Decision-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, scholars have attacked the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence as an incoherent mess. In making such claims,
these scholars have tended to rely on qualitative analysis of the Court’s
opinions and of the text and history of the Fourth Amendment. This
study subjects these claims to empirical examination. It analyzes the coherence of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decision-making by
evaluating the extent to which state high courts and federal courts of
appeals reached the “correct” results on Fourth Amendment issues on
which the Supreme Court later ruled. I also track the frequency with
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which the Supreme Court feels compelled to resolve Fourth Amendment
questions, as compared with other categories of cases. The Study includes an analysis of twenty years of the Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
In addition, the Study tracks variables that might impact the success
of lower courts in reaching the “right” results, including the process the
Court used to derive its directive for each case and whether, ultimately,
the Court’s holding requires future courts to apply a bright-line rule or an
open-ended standard. Because a number of scholars suggest that reference to positive law to determine questions of Fourth Amendment reasonableness could provide greater clarity in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Study also tracks the extent to which Court opinions
have relied on statutes or common law principles to support the Court’s
determinations.
Ultimately, the results suggest that, in recent decades, lower courts
have reached the “right” answers to Fourth Amendment questions most
of the time. Additionally, the performance of lower courts on Fourth
Amendment issues has been roughly comparable to the performance of
lower courts on all issues the Supreme Court addresses, as revealed by
comparison to other studies that have analyzed lower court performance
for other purposes. The Court also has not felt compelled to address
Fourth Amendment questions at a rate that seems disproportionate to its
overall criminal procedure docket or to its treatment of other important
constitutional matters. These data point toward the plausible notion that
the Court has provided better guidance to lower courts on Fourth
Amendment questions than the consensus among scholars would suggest. Finally, the results indicate that the Court should formulate its
Fourth Amendment directives as bright-line rules rather than leaving
lower courts to open-ended balancing on a case-by-case basis if the
Court hopes to increase the coherence of Fourth Amendment law.
In Part I of this Article, I will summarize the critiques of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that provided the impetus for this Study. I will also discuss rare efforts to use comprehensive
theories to describe and defend past Fourth Amendment decision-making
as fitting within a coherent theoretical framework. A close reading of
cases in the Study provides an opportunity to assess some of these theories. In Part II, I will explain the methodology of the Study. The measurement of circuit splits, on which this Study’s validity depends, is
fraught with difficulty. Although I have taken precautions to enhance the
accuracy of my findings, I could not eliminate entirely the pitfalls associated with assessing the dispositions of lower courts on issues the Supreme Court eventually resolved. Additionally, even a clear
demonstration that most lower courts decided Fourth Amendment issues
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“correctly” as determined by the Supreme Court’s ultimate resolution
would not necessarily prove that Supreme Court decision-making led
those lower courts to reach the “right” result. Rather, it could be the case
that the weight of lower court decision-making influenced the Supreme
Court’s disposition of Fourth Amendment issues. For reasons I will discuss in Part II, however, I believe that lower court decisions consistent
with the Supreme Court’s ultimate resolution are an indication of the
coherence and clarity of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In Part III, I will describe the results and implications of the
Study.
I. PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP
The complaint that the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is incoherent is longstanding and widely accepted by legal
scholars. For decades, authors have characterized the Court’s pronouncements on the Fourth Amendment as “illogical, inconsistent with prior
holdings, and, generally, hopelessly confusing”;1 “a mass of contradictions and obscurities”;2 “an embarrassment”;3 “arbitrary, unpredictable,
and often border[ing] on incoherent”;4 “lack[ing] a coherent explanation”;5 and “subjective, unpredictable, and conceptually confused.”6
An assertion that the Court’s holdings have been incoherent has at
least three possible meanings, and authors often fail to parse out the distinctions among those meanings when critiquing the Court’s rulings.
First, a claim of incoherence might mean the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence bears no logical relationship to the text of the
Fourth Amendment or to the intended functions of the Fourth Amendment at the time it was adopted. Second, the claim might mean the directives the Supreme Court issues to solve Fourth Amendment problems are
too unclear for law enforcement officers or courts to understand what
kinds of governmental conduct are authorized, even when dealing with
situations to which those directives obviously apply. Third, the claim
1 Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible
Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171,
1171 (1983).
2 Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468,
1468 (1985).
3 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757
(1994).
4 David E. Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment: The Original Understanding
Revisited, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47, 47 (2005).
5 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 478 (2011) (describing critiques others have leveled at Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence).
6 William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment,
129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1823 (2016).
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might mean that, although the individual directives the Court has issued
give clear guidance to Courts and law enforcement when dealing with
the precise situations governed by those directives, the Court has not
articulated a sufficiently clear set of overarching Fourth Amendment
principles to guide lower courts when those courts are confronted with
novel Fourth Amendment problems.
The second two kinds of incoherence are conceptually distinct from
the first; it would be possible to establish clear directives that offer useful
guidance for law enforcement officers and courts in recurring factual scenarios even if those directives bear no relationship to any reasonable contemporary interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s text or to original
understandings of its meaning, and it would be possible to craft an internally consistent precedential framework for solving new Fourth Amendment problems that offers doctrinal predictability to lower courts even if
that framework bears no relationship to the Fourth Amendment’s text or
history. This Study will examine the second two kinds of claims. Nonetheless, because incoherence in the sense of a lack of clear direction to
law enforcement officers about how to behave and to courts about how to
evaluate that behavior might result from the first kind of incoherence,
and because some authors have argued that is the case, I will summarize
scholarly arguments that the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment bears little relationship to the text of the Amendment or to historical understandings of its function.
The Fourth Amendment contains two independent clauses.7 The
first, the Reasonableness Clause, prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures.8 The second, the Warrant Clause, describes the requirements
for obtaining a valid warrant.9 The relationship between these two
clauses is unclear from the text of the Amendment alone. It is possible to
construe the requirements of the Warrant Clause as implicitly delineating
the conditions for the reasonableness of any search or seizure.10 Alternatively, one might read reasonableness as the overarching command of the
Amendment and interpret the Reasonableness Clause to be not just grammatically, but also conceptually, independent from the Warrant Clause.11
Under this theory, the Warrant Clause merely sets out requirements for a
7 The text of the Fourth Amendment reads as follows: “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581–82 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable Cause: The Fourth Amendment’s Principled Protection of Privacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 595–97 (2008).
11 Bascuas, supra note 10, at 596–97.
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valid warrant when the government seeks a warrant, but it does not modify the Reasonableness Clause.12 Nonetheless, by the middle of the twentieth century, the prevailing view on the Supreme Court was that the
Warrant Clause does modify the Reasonableness Clause and that, “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions,”13 a warrant is required to render any search or seizure
reasonable.14 Under this view, warrants issued by neutral judicial officers
are necessary to protect citizens against potential abuse by law enforcement officials engaged in the “often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime.”15
Prominent commentators have long argued that not only does the
text of the Fourth Amendment not require the government to obtain warrants in all, or almost all, cases to render its searches and seizures reasonable, but that the Amendment’s history also suggests the Framers did not
favor the broad use of warrants.16 Rather, the historical context in which
the Amendment was conceived may reveal that the Framers intended the
Warrant Clause as a mechanism for ensuring that the use of warrants
would be a relative rarity. The chief evil the Framers sought to use the
Fourth Amendment to redress was the common use of general warrants
and writs of assistance during the colonial period.17 These warrants,
which were often issued by executive officials,18 permitted colonial officers to search for seditious materials and evidence of customs violations at will, without any need for individualized suspicion.19 Crucially,
possession of a valid warrant provided government officers with absolute
protection against civil liability in trespass actions,20 which were the primary means by which aggrieved citizens contested government searches
and seizures during the colonial period and beyond.21 In the absence of a
12

See, e.g., id.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
14 See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that this view had
prevailed “at least rhetorically” by the late 1960s).
15 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 367, 369 (1948).
16 See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
38–44 (1969); Bradley, supra note 2, at 1486; Amar, supra note 3, at 759, 774–75.
17 See, e.g., Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the Fourth
Amendment, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 589, 597 (2014).
18 See Amar, supra note 3, at 772–73.
19 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) (“Vivid in the memory of the newly
independent Americans were those general warrants known as writs of assistance under which
officers of the Crown had so bedeviled the colonists. The hated writs of assistance had given
customs officials blanket authority to search where they pleased for goods imported in violation of British tax laws.”); Kamin & Marceau, supra note 17, at 597 (“In drafting the Fourth
Amendment the founders were reacting in large part against the issuance of general warrants which permitted wide-spread searches for seditious materials.”).
20 See Amar, supra note 3, at 777–78.
21 See id. at 772–74. The Supreme Court developed the exclusionary rule for federal
cases only in 1914. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
13
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warrant, however, citizens in the early days of the Republic whose persons, homes, papers, or effects had been subjected to government
searches or seizures would have a chance to convince a jury that the
government officer’s conduct had been unreasonable and to recover
damages.22 Thus, warrants were long seen as instruments by which government officers could escape civil liability, not as a means of protecting
individual rights.23 This context has led some to conclude that the Supreme Court’s insistence on a presumptive warrant requirement has
“‘stood the Fourth Amendment on its head’ from a historical
standpoint.”24
What is the effect of the Court’s regular insistence on a presumptive
warrant requirement? Despite this insistence, the Court’s decisions suggest it adheres to its rhetoric only in the breach. Much of the Court’s
Fourth Amendment decision-making, in fact, has been dedicated to crafting exceptions to the warrant requirement, and it is clear today that government searches conducted without warrants vastly outnumber those
conducted with a warrant.25 In recent years, some of the Court’s decisions have frankly acknowledged that the text of the Amendment does
not necessarily require a preference for warrants and that the ultimate
command of the Amendment is reasonableness,26 and this may represent
the Court’s contemporary trajectory.27 Even in recent cases, though, the

22

Amar, supra note 3, at 774.
See id. at 774–75, 778; see also TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 43.
24 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 23–24). An early proponent of this theory noted that, “[f]ar
from looking at the warrant as a protection against unreasonable searches, [the framers] saw it
as an authority for unreasonable and oppressive searches, and sought to confine its issuance
and execution in line with the stringent requirements . . . .” TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 41. The
most prominent exposition of the theory has been by Akhil Amar. See Amar, supra note 3. To
be sure, not all scholars agree with the argument that the framers favored limited use of warrants. In response to authors like Taylor and Amar, numerous commentators have offered
defenses of a warrant-preference model of Fourth Amendment interpretation, based on their
own readings of the historical record. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth
Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1188 (2016); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 577–78, 584–86 (1999).
25 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582–83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring);
see also Bradley, supra note 2, at 1473–75.
26 See, e.g., Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1132–33 (2014) (“The Fourth
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and provides that a warrant may not
be issued without probable cause, but ‘the text of the Fourth Amendment does not specify
when a search warrant must be obtained’ . . . ‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness’.”) (citations omitted).
27 See, e.g., Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1407 (2010).
23
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Court sometimes continues to adhere to the mythology that virtually all
government searches and seizures require warrants to be reasonable.28
The reason for the stark dichotomy between the Court’s stated warrant requirement and its actual holdings that government actors do not
usually need warrants to justify searches and seizures is fairly straightforward: a broad warrant requirement would be unworkable.29 Actual enforcement of the Court’s rhetoric would prohibit the government from
engaging in a great deal of conduct that both society and all Supreme
Court Justices regard as essentially reasonable.30 Some observers have
argued that the tension between the Court’s regular assertions that all
Fourth Amendment searches and seizures must be supported by warrants
(subject only to a few well-delineated exceptions) and the Court’s widespread abandonment of that principle in practice has produced an incoherent body of law that has generated confusion for police officers
regarding the limits of their authority and for lower courts attempting to
evaluate those officers’ conduct.31
In fact, the Court has dealt with that tension in part through a
strained definition of the seemingly straightforward concept of what constitutes a search in the first instance. Using the test from Katz v. United
States, which defines government conduct as constituting a search only
when the government infringes on an expectation of privacy that “society
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable,’”32 the Court has concluded that
a wide range of activities that clearly constitute “searches” as the word is
commonly used, simply are not Fourth Amendment searches.33 These
28 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2451–52 (2015) (noting that
the Court has repeatedly held that “‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by [a] judge or [a] magistrate [judge], are per se unreasonable . . . subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions’”) (citing Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (accepting that “as a general matter, warrantless searches ‘are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment,’” and noting that “there are ‘a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions’ to that general rule”) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 357); Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (stating the “basic rule” that “‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions’”) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 357).
29 This is true at least in the absence of streamlined procedures for obtaining warrants in
every jurisdiction, including twenty-four hour availability of magistrates. See Bradley, supra
note 2, at 1475, 1492–93.
30 Id., at 1475.
31 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582–83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“There can be no clarity in this area unless we make up our minds, and unless the principles
we express comport with the actions we take.”); Bradley, supra note 2, at 1475 (“By its continued adherence to the warrant requirement in theory, though not in fact, the Court has sown
massive confusion among the police and lower courts.”).
32 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33 Amar, supra note 3, at 768–69.
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activities include government intrusion into and observation of activities
in an open field,34 scrutiny of a home’s curtilage with the naked eye from
an airplane or a helicopter,35 and any other observation of persons or
items in “plain view” that government agents make from a lawful vantage point, at least with the naked eye.36 While designating this kind of
conduct a non-search, and thus, not subject to the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, might be a convenient way to avoid the ostensible
rule that virtually all searches must be supported by warrants, such word
games arguably sow confusion for police officers and lower courts
tasked with adhering to and enforcing the Amendment’s imperatives.37
In sum, according to this line of argument, by misreading text and
history to arrive at the conclusion that Fourth Amendment searches and
seizures almost always require warrants to be reasonable, the Supreme
Court has asserted a rule to which it cannot practically adhere. The disjunction between the Court’s rhetoric and its actual holdings, as well as
the linguistic distortions in which the Court has engaged to sustain partially an illusion of consistency between theory and practice, has resulted
in an incoherent body of jurisprudence impossible for police or lower
courts to follow.
Without necessarily tying the asserted confusing state of Fourth
Amendment law to the Court’s misreading of text and history, other authors have also claimed that the Court’s jurisprudence is contradictory
and incoherent.38 Frequently, these authors have based their arguments,
at least in part, on the indeterminacy of the Katz test for deciding the
threshold question of Fourth Amendment applicability—whether government conduct impinges on an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.39 In short, according to this line of
34

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
215 (1986).
36 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
37 See Amar, supra note 3, at 768–69 (asserting that the Court’s “word games are unconvincing and unworthy”).
38 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 21–22 (2007) (praising the balancing approach the
Court prescribed in Terry v. Ohio, but asserting that, in practice, the Court has used the process
as a “smoke screen for an ad hoc agenda,” which has turned Fourth Amendment law into
“mess,” both “in the sense that police and courts have a hard time mastering it,” and “normatively, in the sense that it does not reflect society’s core values”); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth
Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (2010).
39 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to Katz as a “notoriously unhelpful test”); ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND
WARRANTS 46 (2003) (“How do we know what society is prepared to accept as reasonable?
Because there is no straightforward answer to this question, ‘reasonable’ has largely come to
mean what a majority of the Supreme Court Justices says is reasonable.”); Solove, supra note
38, at 1512 (citing with approval authors who have attacked the Katz test as “unstable,” “illogical,” and “engendering ‘pandemonium’”) (citations omitted); Daniel B. Yeager, Search,
35
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thought, while the Court claims to use an external referent to gauge the
scope of the Amendment’s protections, in practice, Supreme Court Justices have simply decided Fourth Amendment cases based on their own
conceptions of what constitute reasonable expectations of privacy, and
they have done so in an ad hoc, unpredictable manner.40
In response to the perceived chaos of Fourth Amendment law, numerous scholars have devised comprehensive interpretive schemes to direct the Court’s process in future cases. Frequently, a commentator’s
goal in constructing such a theory has been broader than mere clarification of the law; authors have often hoped, also, to promote substantive
values they believe current doctrine fails to advance sufficiently. For
example, several scholars have recommended greater reliance on positive
law to determine the contours of Fourth Amendment protection. Writing
in 1993, Daniel B. Yeager urged the Court to replace Katz’s open-ended
privacy inquiry with a framework in which reference, at least as a first
resort, to local property, tort, contract, and criminal laws would determine the applicability of the Fourth Amendment.41 Only if positive law
provides no indication of privacy interests in any given case would resort
to Katz’s indefinite standard be necessary.42
Christopher Slobogin has argued that the Court should use objective
criteria to assess the intrusiveness of various kinds of government conduct, both in deciding the threshold question of whether government conduct implicates the Fourth Amendment under Katz and in evaluating the
individual rights side of the balance to determine whether conduct that
qualifies as a Fourth Amendment search or seizure is ultimately reasonable.43 Specifically, Slobogin prescribed the use of positive law to evaluate society’s views on privacy and autonomy.44 In situations in which
positive law provides no clear answer, Slobogin recommended the use of
public opinion surveys.45
Most recently, William Baude and James Y. Stern promoted a positive law model for determining whether government conduct constitutes
a search or seizure.46 Under this rubric, government conduct would implicate the Fourth Amendment whenever government actors engage in
investigative activity that would be illegal if performed by “a similarly
Seizure, and the Positive Law: Expectations of Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment, 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249, 251 (1993).
40 Id. at 280–81.
41 Id. at 251–52.
42 Id.
43 SLOBOGIN, supra note 38, at 32?35.
44 Id. at 33.
45 Id.
46 Baude & Stern, supra note 6, at 1825–26.
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situated private actor.”47 Like Yeager and Slobogin, Baude and Stern
would look to tort law, criminal law, and any other generally applicable
law to make this determination.48 Unlike Yeager or Slobogin, however,
Baude and Stern would use a positive law model to replace, rather than
to supplement (Yeager) or refine (Slobogin) Katz’s privacy inquiry.49
Unlike Slobogin, Baude and Stern would use positive law to decide only
the threshold question of Fourth Amendment applicability, not to assess
the reasonableness of conduct already determined to constitute a Fourth
Amendment search or seizure.50
Despite the variations in their theories, each of these authors advocated reference to positive law at least in part to provide greater clarity to
what he perceived as a chaotic field of law. For Yeager, a crucial benefit
of a positive law model is that it makes the law more predictable, rectifying Katz’s “dismal failure” in that regard.51 For Slobogin, the use of positive law to measure intrusiveness is part of a scheme to clean up the
“mess” of Fourth Amendment law, in the sense that, in its current state,
police and courts have difficulty understanding it.52 Baude and Stern also
describe increased clarity and predictability as “a signal advantage” of
their positive law model.53
To be sure, each of these authors also believed his model would
promote important substantive values he believed contemporary doctrine
failed to address. For Yeager, a positive law model would not only provide a “concrete inventory of expectations” that would make Fourth
Amendment law more predictable, but it would also result in enhanced
privacy protection as compared with the “stingy conception of privacy”
the Court had developed under Katz.54 Slobogin hoped not only to make
Fourth Amendment law easier for police and lower courts to follow, but
also to devise a framework that would lead Fourth Amendment law to be
better aligned with “society’s core values.”55 Baude and Stern have promoted their model not only because of its clarifying potential, but also
because they believe it has strong support in the history of the Amendment;56 because it best serves the liberal constitutional value of curbing
abuse of government power;57 because it is more sensitive to the compar47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 1825.
Id.
Id. at 1829–31.
Id. at 1832.
Yeager, supra note 39, at 251–52.
SLOBOGIN, supra note 38, at 22.
Baude & Stern, supra note 6, at 1850.
Yeager, supra note 39, at 251–52.
SLOBOGIN, supra note 38, at 22.
Baude & Stern, supra note 6, at 1837–41.
Id. at 1845–50.
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ative institutional strengths of legislatures;58 and because it is able to
protect a range of social values that includes, but is not limited to, privacy.59 Nonetheless, increasing the coherence of the field was a clear
goal of each of these commentators.
To some extent, the Supreme Court embraced a version of the positive law model in 2012 in United States v. Jones.60 In Jones, Justice
Scalia’s majority rehabilitated the property-based approach to determining the applicability of the Fourth Amendment from Olmstead v. United
States.61 Although the Katz Court had declared that approach to be discredited,62 the Jones Court asserted that Katz’s privacy test had been
intended to supplement rather than to supplant Olmstead.63 Under this
new regime, the Court looks first to a simple formula to determine
whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred: if the government has
physically intruded into a constitutionally protected area to gather information, then its conduct constitutes a search.64 If this formula does not
lead to the conclusion that a search has occurred, then the Court will use
Katz’s expectations-of-privacy test to decide whether the government’s
conduct implicated the Amendment.65 Elaborating on the new regime in
2013, the Court stated that part of its motivation for returning to a positive law model was the clarification of Fourth Amendment law. As the
Court declared, “One virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s property-rights
baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.”66
Of the three positive law models I have summarized, the Jones rubric most closely resembles Yeager’s proposal, which would look first to
positive law and would use Katz in cases in which the positive law provides no clear answer. Nonetheless, the Court’s new approach differs
from Yeager’s framework in important ways. First, the Jones model invokes only property law concepts to inform the inquiry, as compared
with the much broader array of positive law sources on which Yeager
would draw. Second, Scalia’s majority opinions explicating the model
appear to rely on a sort of idealized conception of property law rather
than on the specific trespass laws of the jurisdictions in question.67
58

Id. at 1821.
Id. at 1857.
60 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
61 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
62 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
63 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–51.
64 Id. at 950 n.3.
65 Id. at 953.
66 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013).
67 See Baude & Stern, supra note 6, at 1835 (noting that Scalia’s majority opinions in
Jones and Jardines did not cite any statutes or judicial decisions on property law from the
relevant jurisdictions and that the majority never even used the word “trespass” in Jardines,
relying only on the concept of “physical intrusion”).
59
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Numerous other scholars motivated at least in part by a desire to
increase the coherence of Fourth Amendment decision-making have advanced a wide variety of innovative approaches to interpreting the
Amendment’s requirements. For example, Christopher Solove has argued the Court should abandon Katz’s reasonable-expectations-of-privacy test for determining whether government conduct implicates the
Fourth Amendment in favor of a test that would expand Fourth Amendment coverage to any situation in which government conduct implicates
any problem of “reasonable significance.”68 By recognizing “all of the
problems caused by government information gathering, not just privacy
problems,” Solove argued, the Court would provide “much clearer results.”69 Because almost all government information gathering would
constitute a Fourth Amendment search under this approach,70 the Court
would be freed from having to grapple repeatedly with the inherently
indeterminate question of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of
privacy.71 Instead, the Court could move directly in most cases to the
question of how the Fourth Amendment should regulate the conduct in
question.72 Solove promoted this approach in part because he believed
current doctrine leaves government conduct that implicates important interests entirely unregulated by the Fourth Amendment.73 He also believed his model would provide coherence to a field currently in a state
of “theoretical chaos.”74
Thomas Clancy catalogued five models the Supreme Court uses to
evaluate Fourth Amendment problems: a warrant preference model, an
individualized suspicion model, a totality of the circumstances test, a balancing test, and a hybrid that gives conclusive weight to the common
law.75 According to Clancy, because the Court has failed to develop a
hierarchy for choosing among these models, its jurisprudence has been
inconsistent and internally contradictory.76 Because Clancy believed the
Court had “failed to provide meaningful guidance,” he used objective
criteria, including the Framers’ values,77 to ensure that Fourth Amendment reasonableness would have a “coherent meaning” across the range
of situations to which the Amendment applies.78 Ultimately, Clancy rec68

Solove, supra note 38, at 1514.
Id. at 1534.
70 Id. at 1529, 1534.
71 Id. at 1521.
72 Id. at 1511, 1528–29.
73 Id. at 1514, 1520.
74 Id. at 1512 (citation omitted).
75 Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH
L. REV. 977, 978 (2004).
76 Id. at 978, 1023.
77 Id. at 978, 1043.
78 Id. at 1043.
69
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ommended that an individualized suspicion model should be at the top of
the Fourth Amendment hierarchy, followed by a warrant preference rule
for limited classes of cases.79 Only when necessary to a “strong governmental interest” would departure from these models be permissible.80
Clancy recommended his approach not only as a means of providing coherence to a field riddled with inconsistency and unpredictability, but
also because he believed the current framework had failed to protect citizens against “ever expanding governmental intrusions.”81
For some scholars, remedying the incoherence of Fourth Amendment law has been the paramount goal, as opposed to one among many
aims in reconstructing Fourth Amendment doctrine. According to Craig
Bradley, “the fundamental problem with [F]ourth [A]mendment law is
that it is confusing.”82 In Bradley’s view, the primary reason for the incoherence of contemporary Fourth Amendment law is the dichotomy between the Court’s stated adherence to a warrant requirement and its
regular departure from that supposed rule in practice.83 Bradley argued
the Court had only two choices: 1) to totally eschew rhetorical adherence
to bright-line rules, including a warrant requirement, and to embrace an
open-ended, case-by-case reasonableness test; or 2) to enforce a brightline warrant requirement except in cases of true emergency.84 The first
model would, according to Bradley, “extract the Court from the [quagmire]” of Fourth Amendment law because the Court would only rarely
feel compelled to review lower court decisions applying a broad reasonableness standard to idiosyncratic facts.85 Furthermore, Bradley believed
this approach, which would allow police to use their common sense,
would be easier to follow than the current “set of fictitious rules and
vague exceptions that the Supreme Court itself, not to mention the cop
on the beat, cannot consistently apply or understand.”86 The second option, a true requirement that warrants are almost always necessary, would
provide a simple, bright-line rule for police to follow in most cases.87 For
79

Id. at 1028–29.
Id. at 1029.
81 Id. at 1043.
82 Bradley, supra note 2, at 1472.
83 Id. at 1475.
84 Id. at 1471.
85 Id. at 1488. Such an approach would, in Bradley’s estimation, provide greater clarity
than the Court’s use of numerous, ostensibly bright-line rules of general applicability, which
nonetheless require constant refinement when courts confront cases with new facts. Id. at
1470.
86 Id. at 1489.
87 Id. at 1492. Writing in 1985, Bradley noted that streamlined procedures would be
necessary to make such a warrant requirement workable. He argued that telephonic warrants
would be required and observed that, although the federal system and several states already
made use of telephonic warrants, the Supreme Court had not explicitly approved their use. Id.
at 1492 n.111. Today, the Supreme Court has spoken favorably of telephonic warrants and has
80
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Bradley as well, however, in addition to increasing clarity, he hoped his
proposals would correct injustices associated with current doctrine.88
I do not attempt here to provide an exhaustive catalogue of criticisms of Fourth Amendment doctrine. Rather, I offer the foregoing overview as an illustration of the broad consensus among scholars that Fourth
Amendment law is incoherent, unpredictable, and in fundamental need of
repair. Authors have devoted a great deal of time not only to critiquing
Fourth Amendment doctrine as unprincipled and confusing, but also to
devising new interpretive regimes in order to clean up the current mess.
Only rarely has an author offered a defense of current Fourth
Amendment doctrine. The most prominent apologist for the Court’s contemporary jurisprudence has been Orin Kerr. Kerr has contested charges
of incoherence in the Court’s decision-making under Katz by describing
and defending four models the Court has used for determining Fourth
Amendment applicability under that test. According to Kerr, the use of
each of these models is necessary in different circumstances in order to
effectively regulate government conduct to which the Fourth Amendment should apply.89 In other words, Kerr has argued that the lack of a
unified theory for deciding whether a person’s expectation of privacy is
one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is the inevitable result
of the need to use different concepts to answer that question in different
contexts.90 Moreover, according to Kerr, the Supreme Court’s choice of
which model to use has corresponded relatively well to the situations in
which each model is most effective in determining the kinds of governmental conduct the Amendment should regulate.91
Specifically, Kerr described a probabilistic model, a private facts
model, a positive law model, and a policy model. Under the probabilistic
model, a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in situations in
which social norms suggest there is a low chance that others will “successfully pry into his affairs.”92 Kerr observed that the Court has, on
noted that “[w]ell over a majority of States” allow police or prosecutors to apply for warrants
remotely. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1562 (2013). Bradley also observed that to
make a true warrant requirement feasible, magistrates would have to be available twenty-four
hours a day. Bradley, supra note 2, at 1492. This remains an impediment to implementation of
such a proposal. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1562 (noting that “improvements in communications technology do not guarantee that a magistrate judge will be available when an officer
needs a warrant after making a late-night arrest”).
88 Bradley, supra note 2, at 1479 (claiming that current doctrine leads frequently both to
intrusions on reasonable expectations of privacy and to exclusion of evidence based on technicalities when police have made reasonable efforts to follow the Court’s unclear guidance).
89 Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503,
507 (2007).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 508–09.
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occasion, embraced the probabilistic model.93 It has done so, for example, in deciding that an overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a host’s home because a host would be unlikely to admit people trying to meet with the guest against the guest’s wishes.94 Likewise,
the Court has used this model in holding that a person has no reasonable
expectation that police will not observe his curtilage with the naked eye
from a fixed-wing aircraft at an altitude of 1,000 feet because it is routine
for airplanes to fly over residential areas at that altitude.95 In other situations, the Court has flatly rejected a probabilistic lodestar as a guide to its
inquiry. For example, in cases in which a defendant conveyed information to a third-party confidant, the Court has held that no matter how
small the actual risk that one’s friend might turn out to be an informant,
it is a risk one assumes for Fourth Amendment purposes.96 Yet the
Court’s apparently haphazard use of the probabilistic model leaves Kerr
untroubled. As Kerr argued, the model does not serve as a useful guide in
situations in which relatively modest intrusions on privacy are also
highly unlikely or in situations in which citizens have no control over
whether their private affairs are observed.97 In such circumstances, according to Kerr, the Court’s choice of a different model is a logical decision to use a model that better gauges reasonable expectations of privacy
rather than an example of unprincipled decision-making.98
Under the private facts model, the Court has sometimes held that
reasonable expectations of privacy depend on the character of the information government conduct reveals.99 For example, the Court has held
that a field test of white powder does not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search if the test can reveal only whether the powder is cocaine or not
and cannot disclose any other “arguably ‘private’ fact.”100 Yet in other
cases, including disclosure of information to confidants, the Court has
rejected the private facts model.101 Again, Kerr found the Court’s rejection of a single model for all situations acceptable. As Kerr noted, sometimes the reasonableness of government conduct depends on the
character of the conduct rather than the character of the information revealed.102 Thus, one has a reasonable expectation of privacy against the
government learning even a relatively non-private fact by breaking into
one’s home, while one has no reasonable expectation of privacy against
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id. at 508–12.
Id. at 509–10 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)).
Id. at 510 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)).
Id. at 511–12 (citations omitted).
Id. at 532.
See id.
Id. at 512–13.
Id. at 513 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)).
Id. at 515.
Id. at 534.
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the government hearing about a very private fact if the government
learns the fact through a television news report.103 Furthermore, in many
situations a private facts model would leave police with no way to know
in advance whether their conduct would implicate the Constitution, for
they often have no idea what they will find when they initiate information-gathering activity.104
At times, the Court has used positive law to guide its inquiry. For
example, in some cases, the Court has treated the existence, or lack
thereof, of a property interest as relevant to the question of whether a
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy against government
intrusion.105 In other situations, the Court has stated that positive law was
irrelevant to its determination.106 Kerr supported this apparent inconsistency by noting that, although laws restricting access to information and
places often reflect shared social expectations about kinds of conduct that
cause significant harms, in some circumstances positive law has no relationship to privacy.107
Finally, a policy model answers the question of whether there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy against particular government conduct
by deciding directly whether the conduct is “particularly troublesome to
civil liberties” if left unregulated.108 Each of the other three models
serves as a useful proxy, depending on the circumstances, for answering
this question.109 Despite the more straightforward approach of the policy
model, however, Kerr urged that it should not be the exclusive frame103

Id. at 534–35.
Id. at 535. One might suggest in response to this problem a combined probabilistic/
private facts model in which the reasonableness of one’s expectation of privacy would depend
on the ex ante likelihood that government conduct could reveal particularly private information, as opposed to the character of the information the conduct actually reveals in any given
case. Such an approach would, for Kerr, have the unfortunate effect of undermining some
Fourth Amendment doctrines that Kerr has defended elsewhere, including the current lack of
protection for disclosures to confidants. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for Third-Party Doctrine,
107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009). Nonetheless, such an approach would address some of the
problems Kerr identified with exclusive use of either the probabilistic or private facts models.
It would also solve, for example, the problem of using a pure probabilistic model in situations
in which citizens have no control over their privacy. If the government announced publicly
that it was tapping every single phone in the United States, no one would, thereafter, think the
probability of the government hearing phone conversations would be low. Therefore, a pure
probabilistic model would fail to capture the severity of the invasion of privacy. Kerr, Four
Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, supra note 89, at 532. However, a model that assessed such a program by evaluating the probability that the conduct would reveal particularly
private facts would accurately reflect shared social beliefs about the severity of such an invasion of privacy.
105 See Kerr, supra note 89, at 516.
106 Id. at 518–19 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)).
107 See id. at 532–34.
108 Id. at 519.
109 See id. at 525.
104
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work for deciding whether government conduct implicates the Fourth
Amendment because lower courts, which decide the vast majority of
Fourth Amendment cases, cannot administer it in a way that will provide
consistent results.110
Ultimately, Kerr concluded that the Supreme Court has generally
chosen the model that best addresses whether government conduct implicates significant civil liberties concerns on the facts of the case at
hand.111 Thus, according to Kerr, the superficial appearance that the
Court has chosen among models in a desultory and inconsistent manner
belies a deeper, more principled reality.112 In a more recent article, Kerr
moved from a defense of the Court’s decisions on the threshold question
of Fourth Amendment applicability to a broader defense of the Court’s
Fourth Amendment decision-making in all contexts.113 Again responding
to claims that the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been incoherent, Kerr argued that the myriad and seemingly arbitrary Fourth
Amendment rules the Court has devised have served an overarching goal
of equilibrium adjustment, by which the Court has reacted consistently to
changing technology and social practices to retain the “status quo ante
level” of protection under the Amendment.114
Both Kerr and the numerous authors who have criticized Fourth
Amendment law as incoherent have based their conclusions primarily on
qualitative evaluation of past Court decisions. This Study subjects the
claims these authors have made to empirical analysis by examining Supreme Court opinions and lower court holdings on issues the Supreme
Court would later address over the course of twenty Supreme Court
terms. In the next section, I describe the methodology I have used for the
Study.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. The Case for Using Supreme Court Agreement with Lower Courts
as a Partial Proxy for Coherence in Supreme Court DecisionMaking
The primary method I chose to test the coherence of the Supreme
Court’s Fourth Amendment decision-making was to examine the performance of federal courts of appeals and state supreme courts on Fourth
Amendment questions the Supreme Court would later decide. Specifically, I assessed the extent to which lower courts reached the “right”
answers on Fourth Amendment questions by examining the rate at which
110
111
112
113
114

Id.
Id. at 543.
See id. at 507.
See generally Kerr, supra note 5, at 478.
Id. at 480.
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the Supreme Court affirmed or reversed the positions those courts had
taken before the Supreme Court reached its own conclusions. I used Supreme Court decisions from twenty recent terms, the October 1995 term
through the October 2014 term. Because the Supreme Court tends to
choose to review the most complex and divisive legal issues, I also
tracked the rate at which the Court issued opinions on Fourth Amendment questions, as compared with other important constitutional
problems, since the October 1967 term.
Before explaining the process of data collection and the pitfalls that
entails in this context, it is worth articulating why I believe an accurate
account of lower court performance would provide insight into the clarity
of the Supreme Court’s decision-making. I began with the assumption
that a high rate of Supreme Court rejection of the positions lower courts
took on Fourth Amendment issues would suggest the Supreme Court’s
previous Fourth Amendment pronouncements had provided inadequate
guidance to lower courts tasked with solving Fourth Amendment
problems. That inadequacy might result from Supreme Court decisions
that were confusing or contradictory or that had left lacunae that lower
courts were unable to fill by balancing to determine whether government
conduct was reasonable or by analogy to rules the Court had crafted to
address similar situations in the past. Alternatively, it might result from
the Court simply changing its mind about the dictates of the Fourth
Amendment after having issued seemingly clear pronouncements in the
past.115 Either possibility would suggest a kind of instability or incoherence in Fourth Amendment law. On the other hand, if the Supreme Court
tends to affirm the Fourth Amendment positions of lower courts, that fact
would suggest the Supreme Court’s earlier Fourth Amendment decisions
were sufficiently clear that lower courts could reliably reach conclusions
the Supreme Court would later consider correct. In fact, because other
studies of lower court performance have shown the Supreme Court generally affirms lower court positions (directly or indirectly) about half the
115 This latter phenomenon occurs infrequently in its starkest form—the Court simply
overturning clear Fourth Amendment precedent in a straightforward manner. As the Court
asserted in Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011), “Decisions overruling this Court’s
Fourth Amendment precedents are rare. Indeed, it has been more than 40 years since the Court
last handed down a decision of the type to which Davis refers.” Id. at 247. More commonly,
however, the Court departs from the seemingly clear implications of its Fourth Amendment
precedent while purporting merely to distinguish its prior holdings or to limit their effect.
Compare, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (purporting to distinguish New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)), with Gant, 556 U.S. at 355 (Alito, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the majority opinion effectively overruled Belton); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct.
2473, 2485–86 (2014) (declining to apply the seemingly categorical authority provided by
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), to conduct a search incident to arrest of
property immediately associated with the person of an arrestee to the digital contents of cell
phones).
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time, even a fifty percent rate of agreement with lower courts would
suggest the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decision-making is no
more incoherent than its overall body of jurisprudence.
Of course, a high rate of affirmation of lower court decisions would
not demonstrate definitively that those lower courts reached the “correct”
results because previous Supreme Court decisions had provided them
with clear guidance. It could be the case that the causal relationship is
reversed. One might conclude, that is, that lower court insights on new
Fourth Amendment problems influenced the Supreme Court decisions
that followed. One could imagine that incisive reasoning by a single
lower court might influence the Supreme Court, and that the lower court
might have made convincing arguments despite relative incoherence in
previous Supreme Court decisions, rather than because of the clarity of
Supreme Court precedent. Likewise, when lower court judges have
reached something approaching a consensus on a Fourth Amendment
problem, Supreme Court Justices might find the existence of that consensus compelling when they address the problem later.
In fact, other studies that have tracked the performance of lower
courts on issues the Supreme Court subsequently decided have considered this latter possibility. Stefanie Lindquist and David Klein hypothesized, and ultimately concluded, in a 2006 study that the greater the
number of federal courts of appeals that agreed with a petitioner, the
more likely the Supreme Court was to side with that position.116 Lindquist and Klein attributed this tendency in part to the likelihood that the
reasoning of lower court decisions directly influences Supreme Court
Justices and the idea that a lopsided split might, in and of itself, convince
Supreme Court Justices that the majority position is more legally
sound.117 Likewise, Aaron-Andrew Bruhl examined the possibility that
lower court decisions might influence the Supreme Court’s dispositions
by tracking the extent to which the Court agrees with majorities of lower
courts and the extent to which Supreme Court opinions invoke lower
court determinations.118 Bruhl noted both that the Supreme Court tended
to side with lopsided lower court majorities and that most Supreme Court
cases in which a lopsided majority of lower courts had been in agreement
116 See Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
135, 142, 148 (2006).
117 Id. at 142. Linquist and Klein also attributed this tendency partly to the similar training
of lower court judges and Supreme Court justices. Simply by virtue of that similar training, a
majority of Supreme Court justices are likely to solve legal problems in the same way as
majority of lower court judges. See id.
118 See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI.
L. REV. 851 (2014).
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with each other featured at least one Supreme Court opinion claiming
support from most lower courts.119
Nonetheless, there are compelling reasons to believe the influence
of lower court decisions on the Supreme Court is relatively insignificant.
First, despite Bruhl’s observations, Bruhl himself ultimately characterized the current state of judicial decision-making as involving horizontal
coordination among lower courts “while the Supreme Court mostly
charts its own course.”120 Bruhl based this conclusion on the fact that the
Court often appears unconcerned with exactly how many lower courts
lined up on each side of an issue, even when the Court does mention a
lower court split121; that the Court frequently fails to mention lower court
splits at all, even when such splits are well known122; that, overall, the
Supreme Court opinions in Bruhl’s study mentioned lower court decisions in only about one out of six merits decisions123; and that many of
the references to lower court majorities appeared in dissents, offering
further evidence that “lower courts have at best modest influence on the
Supreme Court.”124 In the end, Bruhl implicitly accepted an alternative
explanation for the correspondence between lopsided lower court majorities and Supreme Court dispositions: that such correspondence suggests
the law often supplies a clear answer to the question at issue, which leads
most jurists to reach the correct result.125 Of course, when it comes to
constitutional decision-making, the Supreme Court’s previous pronouncements on the relevant constitutional provision are crucial to the
clarity (or lack thereof) of the state of the law.
Bruhl’s empirical conclusions largely confirmed the less systematic
observations of scholars and jurists who had previously considered the
question of the influence of lower courts on the Supreme Court. Writing
in 1970, Judge Henry Friendly noted that, for the Supreme Court, the
views of lower courts “count, and should count, for little.”126 Writing a
generation later, D.C. Circuit Judge Patricia Wald commented that, although divisions among lower courts seemed to prompt review by the
Supreme Court, there was “little indication” that the Supreme Court
found the lower court decisions to be “a prolific source of analyses or

119

Id. at 901.
See id. at 923.
121 Id. at 905.
122 See id. at 905–06.
123 See id. at 915.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 894–95.
126 Henry J. Friendly, The “Law of the Circuit” and All That: Foreword to the Second
Circuit 1970 Term, 46 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 406, 407 (1972).
120
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insights.”127 In 1996, Arthur Hellman described an “Olympian” and “imperial” Supreme Court that had moved toward greater detachment from
the work of lower courts, in part by ignoring the efforts of lower court
judges to address issues on the Court’s docket.128 These conclusions represent a rejection not only of the idea that the existence of something
like a consensus among lower courts, in and of itself, might influence the
Supreme Court, but also of the notion that the Supreme Court frequently
draws on the wisdom of individual lower courts in making its own
decisions.
In the Fourth Amendment context in particular, there is also evidence the Court has largely disregarded the views of lower courts. In a
2012 article cataloguing over three-dozen contemporary Fourth Amendment circuit splits and critiquing the Court’s failure to resolve them,
Wayne Logan considered and rejected the idea that the Court might allow Fourth Amendment problems to percolate among lower courts for
extended periods in order to enrich its own decisions by drawing on the
wisdom of other jurists and the experiences of actors tasked with implementing differing solutions to similar problems.129 Examining 138
Fourth Amendment cases the Court decided over a thirty-year period,
Logan observed that the Court’s opinions mentioned the existence of a
federal circuit split in only seventeen cases.130 Moreover, even when the
Court did mention lower court positions on Fourth Amendment issues,
the Court seemed uninterested in assessing the merits of the views of the
various circuits; rather, the Court generally noted lower court division
only in passing and based its conclusions on its own precedent or the
perspectives of individual Justices.131 For Logan, these data justified the
long-held skepticism of the influence of percolation theory on the
Court.132
127 Patricia M. Wald, Upstairs/Downstairs at the Supreme Court: Implications of the
1991 Term for the Constitutional Work of the Lower Courts, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 771, 792
(1993).
128 Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
403, 435–37.
129 Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth
Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1166–71 (2012).
130 Id. at 1167.
131 Id. at 1167–68. The Court’s lack of reliance on lower court reasoning in the Fourth
Amendment context is also consistent with the observation that lower courts facing constitutional questions often eschew direct engagement with the Constitution, instead choosing to
base their decisions entirely on parsing of Supreme Court precedent. The Court, of course, is
unlikely to believe itself in need of assistance from outsiders in interpreting its own prior
cases. See Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV.
145, 150 (2008).
132 Logan, supra note 129, at 1169; see also Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 57
(1994) (“I doubt that the strength of an inferior court’s conviction that a particular interpretation provides the best reading will—or should—influence the Supreme Court’s independent
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Of course, the question of the direction of influence between the
Supreme Court and lower courts is not an all-or-nothing proposition.
Rather, one can imagine a feedback loop in which the clarity of the Supreme Court’s pronouncements impacts the way lower courts line up on
future issues, and those subsequent lineups, along with the reasoning of
individual lower courts, then influence the Supreme Court when it
reaches the newer questions the lower courts have addressed. Nonetheless, for all of the reasons I have articulated, there is good cause to believe the opinions of lower courts generally, and the existence of broad
agreement among those lower courts in particular, have at best modest
influence on the Supreme Court.
Even that likelihood does not prove that the coherence of previous
Supreme Court pronouncements deserves sole credit when there is consensus among lower courts with which the Supreme Court later agrees.
For example, federal courts of appeals can and do coordinate among
themselves for independent reasons, chiefly related to various interests
served by national uniformity.133 Nonetheless, confusing and contradictory Supreme Court precedent should be expected to be an impediment
to such coordination. And, given the above analysis, the Supreme
Court’s agreement with the conclusions those courts have drawn suggests the Supreme Court believes, based on its own independent analysis,
that those lower courts have reached the correct results. In the end, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that when lower courts, either individually or collectively, get the “right” answers to Fourth Amendment
questions, that fact suggests that Supreme Court precedent was coherent
enough for those courts to predict the Supreme Court’s eventual disposition of the current issue. That coherence might derive either from specific rules that provide straightforward guidance or from broad,
overarching principles that offer enough direction that lower courts can
reasonably arrive at solutions with which the Court will agree.
While I believe that Supreme Court agreement with lower court decisions is a reasonable, rough proxy for the clarity of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence, there is an important way in which even an accurate count of lower court positions on issues the Supreme Court later
judgment. It is difficult to see what expertise the inferior court might bring to the problem that
would outweigh the general presumption of greater proficiency in the Supreme Court.”); Todd
J. Tiberi, Supreme Court Denials of Certiorari in Conflicts Cases: Percolation or Procrastination, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 861, 889 (1993) (finding that the Court cited lower courts for ideas
important to its holdings in only thirteen of thirty-six percolated cases studied). Although a
study using plagiarism software found overlap between the language of lower court opinions
and Supreme Court majority opinions, the study did not distinguish between factual recitations
and “arguments relating to the substance of the legal questions facing the courts.” See Pamela
C. Corley et al., Lower Court Influence on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, 73 J. POL.
31, 42 (2011).
133 Bruhl, supra note 118, at 922–23.
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addressed is likely to undervalue the coherence of Supreme Court decision-making. Although the weight of authority suggests that the Supreme
Court does not rely heavily on the reasoning of lower courts and that the
Court is relatively unconcerned with exactly how lower courts line up on
issues the Court chooses to address, the simple fact that lower courts
have disagreed with each other on an issue often influences the Court’s
decision to review the question. In fact, it is widely accepted that the
most important factor, by far, in the Court’s decisions to accept certiorari
is the existence of a division of authority among lower courts.134 Thus,
although the Supreme Court rarely draws on the wisdom of lower courts,
it does place a premium on resolution of lower court conflict in choosing
which cases to hear. The Court, that is, is much more likely to accept
cases in which the legal issues are difficult and confusing enough that
lower courts have reached differing conclusions in deciding how to resolve those issues.
Ultimately, the Court accepts certiorari in only about one percent of
the cases it is petitioned to review,135 taking about eighty cases per
year.136 The handful of Fourth Amendment cases on the Court’s docket
each term represents only a small fraction of Fourth Amendment cases
lower courts decide each year, and only a tiny portion of the Fourth
Amendment issues those lower courts address.137 Because of the Court’s
priorities, issues in all legal fields that have generated widespread consensus among lower courts are likely to be underrepresented on the
Court’s docket.138
If one accepts that the existence of such consensus likely reflects the
clarity of the answer to the legal question at issue (which derives in part
from the coherence of the Supreme Court’s previous decisions), then it
134 See, e.g., H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 246 (1991); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Measuring Circuit Splits: A
Cautionary Note, 4 J.L.: PERIODICAL LABORATORY OF LEG. SCHOLARSHIP 361, 361 (2014); see
also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Workways of the Supreme Court, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 517,
521 (2003) (noting that about seventy percent of the cases the Court agrees to hear “involve
deep divisions of opinion among federal courts of appeals or state high courts”); David R.
Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85
TEX. L. REV. 947, 981 (2007) (observing that approximately seventy percent of the Court’s
cases from 2003 to 2005 involved lower court splits).
135 See, e.g., EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 321 (9th ed. 2007);
The Supreme Court 2014 Term—The Statistics, 129 HARV. L. REV. 381 (2015); The Supreme
Court 2013 Term—The Statistics, 128 HARV. L. REV. 401 (2014); The Supreme Court 2012
Term—The Statistics, 127 HARV. L. REV. 408, 416 (2013); The Supreme Court 2011 Term—
The Statistics, 126 HARV. L. REV. 388, 395 (2012).
136 See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 134, at 381.
137 See Solove, supra note 38, at 1534.
138 Bruhl, supra note 118, at 880; John S. Summers & Michael J. Newman, Towards a
Better Measure and Understanding of U.S. Supreme Court Review of Courts of Appeals Decisions, 80 U.S.L.W. 393, 3 (2011) (noting that the Supreme Court tends to select “‘tough
cases,’ i.e., circuit splits, where differences of opinion are likely”).
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follows that examination of lower court positions only on issues the Supreme Court later chose to address would underrepresent the coherence
of Supreme Court decision-making. For this reason, it is important that
other authors have attempted to track the performance of lower courts
generally when the Supreme Court addresses issues those courts have
previously attempted to answer. Although the conclusions one draws
from assessing such performance within one field are incomplete and
likely to undervalue the coherence of Supreme Court decision-making,
the existence of similar data outside the Fourth Amendment context provides some basis for comparing the coherence of the Court’s Fourth
Amendment decision-making to the Court’s jurisprudence in other
realms.
Finally, an assessment of the performance of lower courts in what
are likely the most difficult, divisive cases can provide only partial insight into the clarity of the Court’s jurisprudence because such an analysis, by itself, offers no sense of the likelihood that the Court’s
pronouncements in a given field will produce the kind of uncertainty that
divides lower courts and requires Supreme Court intervention. For this
reason, it is necessary to supplement evaluation of the performance of
lower courts on issues the Supreme Court later addresses with an inquiry
into the frequency with which such difficult issues arise in the first place.
Even an assessment of the rate at which the Court accepts certiorari in
various classes of cases is imperfect. The rate at which the Supreme
Court intervenes in a given area of law might not be fully representative
of the extent to which lower courts face difficult issues in that field; the
Court might decline to resolve divisions of lower court authority more
often in some areas than in others. Additionally, even a perfect tally of
the numbers of lower court splits in various areas of law would, by itself,
be incomplete, for one must also resolve the question of which denominator to use to evaluate the significance of such splits. For example, if
government conduct implicates one individual right with greater frequency than another, one would expect a greater amount of litigation
over the former right than the latter. The larger number of cases would,
consequently, create more opportunities for divisions of authority with
regard to the first right, regardless of the clarity of the state of the law in
either field. This is particularly salient in the Fourth Amendment context,
for routine government conduct likely implicates the Fourth Amendment
rights of citizens more than any other constitutional right.139 Thus, supplementing an evaluation of lower court performance on issues the Supreme Court chooses to resolve with an assessment of the frequency with
139 See Clancy, supra note 75, at 977 (noting myriad instances in which the government
conducts Fourth Amendment searches or seizures, including the thousands of vehicle stops
that occur each day).
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which such cases arise enriches the conclusions one might draw about
the coherence of the Court’s decision-making, but the enhanced inquiry
is, nonetheless, far from perfect.
B. Data Collection
Accepting the idea that Supreme Court agreement with lower courts
might be a useful, partial proxy for assessing the coherence of Supreme
Court precedent represents only the first step in a complex process. Collecting the relevant data presents enormous challenges, some of which
are inherently insurmountable. The first step in such a process requires
identifying the relevant cases to be examined. The most rudimentary
approach to assessing the performance of lower courts would be to examine only the Supreme Court’s direct reversal rate. In fact, while Craig
Bradley’s 1985 assertions of Fourth Amendment incoherence depended
largely on qualitative analysis, Bradley supported his thesis at the outset
with the observation that, in its Fourth Amendment cases, the Supreme
Court usually reversed the decision of the highest court below.140
A first-level response to this kind of observation would be to point
to the Court’s reversal rates in other fields; it has long been known that
the Supreme Court, in general, reverses the decisions of lower courts
much more frequently than it affirms those decisions, and in recent years
the Court’s direct reversal rate has been between seventy and seventyfive percent.141 Thus, one might suggest, if direct reversal rates demonstrate the incoherence of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
they also suggest the Court’s overall body of jurisprudence is incoherent.
But a more thorough response would highlight the inadequacy of direct
reversal rates as a measure of lower court performance. If the Supreme
Court agrees to hear a case from the Fifth Circuit, for example, it is
possible that the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits have also considered the issue at hand. If the Court reverses the Fifth Circuit decision,
but the other lower courts all agreed with the Supreme Court’s eventual
disposition, then examination of only the direct reversal rate would fail to
account for the fact that eighty percent of lower courts had actually gotten the answer right. If those other courts had been in agreement with the
Fifth Circuit, evaluation of only direct review would fail to reflect that
five lower courts had gotten the wrong answer, rather than only one.
140 Bradley, supra note 2, at 1468, 1475 n.47 (noting that the Supreme Court had usually
reversed in its Fourth Amendment cases in the previous two years, that in the 1982–83 term,
the Court reversed in seven of nine Fourth Amendment cases, and that the lower courts in
those cases had been attempting, unsuccessfully it turned out, to apply Supreme Court
precedent).
141 LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 271 tbl.3–6 (5th ed. 2012).
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Examination of the performance of all lower courts that have addressed issues the Supreme Court later resolved is likely to provide more
accurate data on lower court performance than analysis only of direct
review for at least two important reasons: sample size and selection bias.
First, the Court directly reviews only about one tenth of one percent of
circuit court judgments.142 Given the small number of cases the Court
reviews directly each year overall,143 and the much smaller number still
on any specialized topic like Fourth Amendment law, a study focused
only on direct review, depending on the topic and time period covered,
might produce an inadequately robust sample size for reliable results.
Second, even if one is studying multiple years of the Court’s entire
docket, direct review is a deficient mechanism for examining lower court
performance because the Supreme Court’s selection of cases to review is
systematically biased; a significant body of research shows the court has
a tendency to grant certiorari in cases in which it intends to reverse the
court directly below.144
For these reasons, several recent studies have attempted to measure
the performance of lower courts through examination of indirect or “parallel” review by the Supreme Court.145 These studies repeatedly show
that lower courts have gotten the “right” answer about twice as often as
examination of only direct review would suggest; studies including parallel review demonstrate that the Court has tended to affirm lower courts
about half the time in recent years, with results from various years rang-

142

Tom Cummins & Adam Aft, Appellate Review, 2 J.L.: PERIODICAL LABORATORY OF
SCHOLARSHIP 59, 59 (2012) (citing Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of Appeals, LANDSLIDE, Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 8).
143 See id.
144 See, e.g., RICHARD FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1469 (6th ed. 2009) (citations omitted); Thomas Baker, The Eleventh
Circuit’s First Decade Contribution to the Law of the Nation, 1981–1991, 19 NOVA L. REV.
323, 327 (1994). This is not to suggest that parallel review provides anything like a perfect
measurement of lower court performance. For example, as discussed above, the Court has a
propensity to accept certiorari on issues that have divided lower courts. If cases in which lower
courts are in agreement are underrepresented on the Court’s docket, and if those lower courts
tend to agree with each other because the law supplies a fairly clear answer, an answer with
which the Supreme Court would also be likely to agree, then parallel review also underrepresents the extent to which lower courts arrive at conclusions the Supreme Court would
consider correct. Nonetheless, parallel review supplies at least a marginally better tool for
evaluating lower court performance than direct review alone.
145 See Bruhl, supra note 134, at 361–62; Cummins & Aft, supra note 142, at 60; Tom
Cummins & Adam Aft, Appellate Review II—October Term 2011, 3 J.L.: PERIODICAL LABORATORY OF LEG. SCHOLARSHIP 37, 37 (2013); Tom Cummins, Adam Aft, & Joshua Cumby,
Appellate Review III: October Term 2012 and Counting, 4 J.L.: PERIODICAL LABORATORY OF
LEG. SCHOLARSHIP 385, 386–87 (2014); Eric Hansford, Measuring the Effects of Specialization with Circuit Split Resolutions, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2011).
LEG.
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ing from forty-four percent to sixty-four percent affirmation of lower
court positions.146
Once one has chosen to examine parallel review data, further questions arise. Several threshold questions relate to the category of Supreme
Court cases to be included in the study and how to identify those cases.
Others involve determinations of how to count lower court decisions associated with the Supreme Court cases one has selected for inclusion.
With regard to the category of Supreme Court cases that should be included, one must decide whether to focus only on cases with issues on
which more than one lower court had weighed in, or to include reversal
rates for cases in which only the court being reviewed directly by the
Supreme Court had addressed the issue at hand. The latter situation often
involves idiosyncratic facts that limit the possibilities that previous guidance of any sort could conclusively resolve the issue or that other courts
would be likely to face identical facts in the future. For example, cases in
which the ultimate question is whether the totality of the circumstances
gave police probable cause to believe a crime had been committed frequently involve such idiosyncratic facts. More importantly, the Court’s
known bias for selecting cases in which it intends to reverse the court
directly below makes these cases likely to be unrepresentative of lower
court performance, even within the narrow class of relatively difficult
issues the Supreme Court selects for review. For this reason, I believe a
focus only on Supreme Court cases in which more than one lower court
has previously ruled on the issue is the superior approach.147 Nonetheless, I collected data for the idiosyncratic “one-off” cases as well to provide a basis for comparison.
Within the category of Supreme Court cases in which more than one
lower court had weighed in, one must also decide whether to examine
Supreme Court cases in which lower courts were unanimous in their conclusions or to assess only cases in which there was a true split of author146 See Bruhl, supra note 142, at 364; Cummins & Aft, Appellate Review, supra note 142,
at 61 (using parallel review analysis to find that the Court affirmed lower courts sixty-four
percent of the time in cases involving circuit splits during the October 2010 term); Cummins &
Aft, Appellate Review II, supra note 145, at 38 (observing that the Supreme Court affirmed
lower courts on parallel review, in cases involving circuit splits, forty-four percent of the time
for the October 2011 term); Cummins, Aft, & Cumby, supra note 145, at 394 (showing that
the Court directly or indirectly affirmed fifty-one out of 101 lower court decisions in cases
involving circuit splits during the October 2012 term); Hansford, supra note 145, at 1165 tbl.1
(using parallel review to show that the Supreme Court affirmed lower court positions in cases
involving circuit splits fifty-four percent of the time between 2005 and 2008); Summers &
Newman, supra note 138, at 4 (revealing that the Supreme Court agreed with lower court
positions in cases involving circuit splits 51.7% of the time between 2005 and 2010).
147 This is consistent with the approach of other studies. See Cummins, Aft, & Cumby,
supra note 145, at 391; Hansford, note 145, at 1174; Summers & Newman, supra note 138, at
3 (including an overall reversal rate for all cases, but also providing a separate rate for cases in
which more than one lower court had ruled on the issue).
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ity among lower courts. The answer to this question should depend on
what one hopes to measure. For one interested in a broad evaluation of
lower court performance, as opposed to cases involving divisions of authority as such, analysis of any Supreme Court case in which more than
one lower court had weighed in would be the best metric. Other studies
have taken this approach,148 and I chose it as well.149
Additionally, one must decide whether to count only Supreme Court
cases in which multiple federal courts of appeals had weighed in or to
include state court decisions as well when classifying a Supreme Court
decision as one in which more than one lower court had ruled. As with
the question of whether to include only Supreme Court cases involving
true splits of lower court authority or all cases in which more than one
lower court had addressed the relevant issue, the answer to this question
should depend on what one hopes to measure. If one is concerned primarily with assessing the performance of federal courts of appeals, studying
only those courts would make sense.150 On the other hand, if one is interested, more broadly, in evaluating the rate of agreement between lower
courts and the Supreme Court, a more expansive approach that includes
state supreme court decisions would provide more complete results.151 I
took the latter approach.
Having chosen the substantive parameters for selection of Supreme
Court cases, one must make a further determination of which sources to
consult in identifying those cases. Some studies used the Supreme Court
Database, founded by Harold Spaeth,152 to identify relevant Supreme
Court cases.153 The Database includes the reason for granting certiorari,
148 Summers & Newman, supra note 138, at 2. Although Cummins, Aft, and Cumby
described their data set as including only cases in which “the Court both resolves a split and
explicitly identifies courts involved in the split,” their study included cases in which they were
able to identify only lower courts taking one side of the issue. See Cummins, Aft, & Cumby,
supra note 145, at 391, app. A at 397.
149 In the present study, this choice had limited consequences. Lower courts were unanimous in two of fifty-one Supreme Court decisions in which more than one lower court had
weighed in. There were a total of five lower court decisions associated with these two cases,
out of 370 individually counted lower court decisions associated with forty-four Supreme
Court cases in which more than one lower court had ruled and 545 lower court decisions when
including approximations for seven Supreme Court cases in which lopsided majorities of lower
courts were apparent, but for which the precise lineup of lower courts was difficult to calculate
with precision using my methodology.
150 Other studies have taken this approach. See Cummins & Aft, Appellate Review, supra
note 142; Cummins & Aft, Appellate Review II, supra note 145; Cummins, Aft, & Cumby,
supra note 145, at 390; Hansford, supra note 145, at 1146–47; Summers & Newman, supra
note 138, at 1.
151 See Bruhl, Measuring Circuit Splits, supra note 134, at 377 n.37.
152 Harold Spaeth et al., Supreme Court Database: The Genesis of the Database, SUP. CT.
DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org/about.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2016, 8:40 p.m.).
153 See Cummins & Aft, Appellate Review, supra note 142, at 64; Cummins & Aft, Appellate Review II, supra note 145, at 39.
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as reported by the Court, among the 247 variables it tracks for each
Supreme Court case,154 and this variable takes account of various kinds
of lower court splits, including “federal court conflict,” “state court conflict,” “conflict between federal court and state court,” “federal court uncertainty,” and “state court uncertainty.”155
The Database, however, has two important limitations. First, the
Database undercounts Supreme Court cases relevant to the study. In the
context of this Study, the undercounting results partly from the nature of
the cases I have opted to review; although the Database’s variable on the
Court’s reason for granting certiorari can take on a variety of values signifying lower court splits, none of the values the Database uses specifically address situations in which several lower courts had evaluated the
issue at hand but all agreed with each other.156 Even among cases involving true splits, reliance only on the Database leads to undercounting, in
part as a consequence of the parsimonious way in which the Database
accounts for lower court splits. As Professor Bruhl has documented, the
Database codes the reason for certiorari as a division of lower court authority only if the lead opinion explicitly describes a lower court split as
the reason for reviewing the issue; even when a majority opinion mentions a split of lower court authority very near to its description of the
reasons for granting certiorari, the Database will not code the case as one
involving a split unless the lead opinion directly describes the split as a
certiorari catalyst.157 The underrepresentation of splits in the Database
also derives in part from the Supreme Court’s regular failure to mention
lower court divisions of authority at all.158 Ultimately, examination of
the Database tends to suggest the Court’s certiorari decisions depend on
lower court splits in about thirty to forty percent of the Court’s cases.159
Meanwhile, sophisticated observers tend to believe that around seventy
percent of Supreme Court cases actually involve divisions of authority
among lower courts.160
If undercounting were the only limitation of the Database, that limitation might be relatively unimportant if one were interested in assessing
long-term trends; a study of enough years of cases could yield an adequate sample size. For a study of a specialized field like Fourth Amendment law, on which the Court accepts no more than a few cases a year,
however, insufficient sample size would be likely to be a problem even
for a relatively long-term study. Furthermore, the Court’s frequent failure
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

Spaeth et al., supra note 152.
See id.
Id.; see also Bruhl, supra note 134, at 367.
Id.
See Bruhl, supra note 118, at 905; see also Bruhl, supra note 134, at 371–72.
See Bruhl, supra note 134, at 367.
Ginsburg, supra note 134, at 521; Stras, supra note 134, at 981.
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to mention lower court splits raises a second potential shortcoming of the
Database—the possibility of systematic bias in the cases included in the
study.161
For one thing, Supreme Court Justices have widely varying tendencies to mention lower court splits in their majority opinions.162 For example, the Database coded only ten cases in which Justice Thomas wrote
the majority opinion as involving splits for the four Terms from 2010
through 2013, while it coded seventeen and eighteen opinions by Justices
Kagan and Sotomayor respectively as involving splits during those same
years.163 Although some of this variation might reflect differing rates at
which various Justices are assigned cases involving splits, some of it also
reflects the dissimilar writing styles of the Justices.164
Likewise, the Justices have differing jurisprudential philosophies
that can affect the likelihood that lower courts will get the “right” answers. For example, Justice Thomas is known to give relatively little
weight to Supreme Court precedent.165 Because lower courts rely heavily
on Supreme Court precedent in answering constitutional questions,166
one might expect those courts to get the “right” answers less frequently
when Justice Thomas writes for the majority. Thus, underrepresentation
of lower court splits in Thomas opinions in the Database would tend to
overrepresent the extent to which lower courts answer constitutional
questions correctly.
Some studies have eschewed reliance on the Database and have,
instead, examined Supreme Court opinions directly to identify cases in
which more than one lower court had ruled on the issue at hand.167 Reading Supreme Court opinions, including concurrences and dissents, only
partially solves the problems posed by exclusive reliance on the
Database. First, reading the opinions does identify cases in which the
Database’s stringent coding standards fail to classify the case as involv161

See Bruhl, supra note 134, at 373–74.
Id.
163 See id. at 383 tbl.2.
164 Id. at 373–74.
165 See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist Court, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791, 797 (2005) (noting that Justice Thomas prioritizes
original meaning over precedent); Bradford C. Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of
Standing: Closer to Justice Breyer’s Approach to Standing than to Justice Scalia’s, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 71, 105–06 (2012) (observing that Justice Thomas gives more weight to the views
of the framers of the Constitution than to Supreme Court precedent); Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1042 n.139
(2007) (stating that “[s]ome of Justice Thomas’s opinions suggest that he gives little weight to
precedent”).
166 See Amar, supra note 131, at 150.
167 See Cummins, Aft, & Cumby, supra note 145, at 389 (describing a shift from reliance
on the Database in previous studies to reliance on Supreme Court opinions themselves, in
response to criticisms by Professor Bruhl); Summers & Newman, supra note 138, at 2.
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ing a split, but in which one or more of the opinions mention the existence of a division of lower court authority or describe multiple lower
courts as having agreed on the issue at hand. Additionally, one might
expect reading each of the Supreme Court opinions associated with each
case to counter, to some extent, the distortions caused by the varying
tendencies of individual Justices to mention splits. Nonetheless, reading
the opinions cannot counter the likely proclivity of the Court to mention
circuit splits when the Court sides with most lower courts but to ignore
lower court opinions otherwise, at least in cases in which the Supreme
Court decision is unanimous.168 Overall, the Court’s established tendency to ignore known splits among lower courts is likely to lead to
significant undercounting, a particular problem for a study such as this
one, in which only a few Supreme Court cases per year are initial candidates for the data set. Like studies depending exclusively on the Supreme
Court Database, studies that have relied only on reading Supreme Court
opinions to classify cases involving lower court splits have, unsurprisingly, arrived at figures significantly lower than one would expect based
on conventional wisdom about the Court’s priorities in granting
certiorari.169
Because of the limitations of exclusive reliance on the Supreme
Court Database or the Supreme Court’s opinions, I chose to begin with
the Court’s opinions but to look beyond the four corners of those opinions to supplement my research. Initially, I conducted a search for the
term “Fourth Amendment” within Westlaw’s Supreme Court database. I
then arranged the results chronologically and began reading the opinions
from the October 1995 term through the October 2014 term. I eliminated
cases that mentioned the Fourth Amendment only in passing.170 I also
focused only on cases in which the Court definitively ruled on the merits
of a substantive Fourth Amendment claim squarely before the Court.
This led me to eliminate cases in which the Court concluded only that a
defendant was entitled to qualified immunity from suit, without determining whether the government’s conduct in fact violated the Fourth
Amendment.171 For each case that I did not exclude using these criteria,
I read each Supreme Court opinion associated with the case for evidence
168

See Bruhl, supra note 134, at 374.
See Cummins, Aft, & Cumby, supra note 145, at 389 (counting twenty-seven of seventy-eight cases from the October 2012 term as involving lower court splits); Summers &
Newman, supra note 138, at 2 (finding that 176 of 397 cases from the federal courts of appeals
between 2005 and 2010 involved issues on which more than one court of appeals had ruled);
see also Bruhl, supra note 134, at 371 (identifying splits in less than half the Court’s docket
from the 2010 term by reading Supreme Court opinions).
170 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509–10 (2012) (discussing the
Fourth Amendment in passing in considering the issue of federal preemption of state law).
171 See, e.g., Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 352 (2014); Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct.
1861, 1868 (2014) (deciding only that the district court should not have granted summary
169
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that multiple lower courts had addressed the relevant Fourth Amendment
question. If any Supreme Court opinion described a split of lower court
authority or otherwise revealed that multiple lower courts had reviewed
the Fourth Amendment issue, I accepted the Court’s assertions. However, when the Court was silent about whether multiple lower courts had
ruled on an issue, I relied on additional materials to answer the
question.172
Specifically, I read the filings of the parties to the case, including,
when available on Westlaw, the petition for certiorari, the respondent’s
brief in opposition, and amicus briefs. Depending on what the foregoing
materials revealed, I also read lower court opinions and secondary source
material for some cases. It was important to examine filings from both
sides of each case because of the incentives each side has to distort the
record of lower court authority. For example, given the Court’s known
preference for accepting certiorari in cases involving conflict among
lower courts, petitioners have an incentive to assert such conflict whenever possible.173 More broadly, petitioners have an incentive to claim
that multiple lower courts have faced the issue in question because the
Supreme Court is likely to consider an issue that has required repeated
attention to be more important than one so idiosyncratic that only one
lower court has faced it. On the other hand, a respondent has an incentive
to deemphasize lower court conflict and the importance of the legal issue
in question.174 Therefore, when the parties disagreed about the existence
of a split or whether multiple lower courts had addressed the relevant
issue, I read additional materials, including the lower court decisions in
question.175
judgment on the question of qualified immunity); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 4 (2013);
Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1667–68 (2012).
172 As I will discuss below, even when the Court did acknowledge lower court opinions, I
examined extrinsic materials to discern the dispositions of lower courts that had ruled on the
matter in question.
173 Bruhl, supra note 134, at 375.
174 Reading briefs for the Supreme Court cases in my data set showed these incentives at
work. Compare, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Florida v. Jardines, 2011 WL 5254666
at 18–21 (claiming that the decision of the Florida Supreme Court conflicted with decisions of
the Seventh and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals), and Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
United States v. Jones, 2011 WL 1462758 at 20–23 (claiming the existence of a split of authority among lower courts), with Respondent’s Amended Brief in Opposition, Florida v.
Jardines, 2011 WL 8865675 at 23–25 (asserting that the Seventh and Eighth Circuit decisions
were distinguishable from that of the Florida Supreme Court and, thus, that there was no
division of authority among lower courts), and Brief in Opposition, United States v. Jones,
2011 WL 2263361 at 19–23 (denying the existence of a split among lower courts).
175 The parties likely have the strongest incentives to assert or deny the existence of multiple lower court decisions on the issue in question at the certiorari stage. See Arthur D.
Hellman, Never the Same River Twice: The Empirics and Epistemology of Intercircuit Conflicts, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 81, 101 (2001) (stating that the certiorari petition and the petitioner’s
reply brief are the briefs most likely to assert a conflict among lower courts). If the petition for
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Although this relatively comprehensive approach can help identify
relevant cases that exclusive reliance on the Supreme Court Database or
the Court’s opinions would fail to detect,176 it carries its own costs and
risks. Aside from the time-consuming nature of the process,177 going beyond the four corners of the Supreme Court’s opinions adds additional
layers of subjectivity to the subjective judgments of the Supreme Court
Justices.178 When the Supreme Court failed to mention the existence of
multiple lower court decisions, I relied on the descriptions of the parties
if they agreed about the existence of a circuit split or whether multiple
lower courts had addressed the issue at stake, and, if the parties disagreed, I independently assessed the question by reading the relevant
lower court opinions. If the parties agreed, their competing self-interests
provided some indication of the reliability of the agreed upon characterization.179 If the parties disagreed, I had to make difficult judgment calls
about whether more than one lower court had truly addressed the question at hand or, alternatively, whether the proffered cases were distinguishable. If my judgments in this regard were systematically biased, that
would, of course, affect the results of the Study.180
certiorari or the respondent’s brief in opposition were unavailable on Westlaw, I focused on
other available briefs and, at times, lower court opinions. If a petition for certiorari was available and claimed that multiple lower courts had weighed in, but no brief in opposition was
available on Westlaw, I examined other briefs and any lower court opinions mentioned in the
available briefs to verify the petitioner’s claims. For several cases, a petition for certiorari was
available and asserted that multiple lower courts had ruled on the issue, but there was no brief
in opposition. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United States v. Grubbs, 547
U.S. 90 (2006); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S.
194 (2002); Penn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998); Maryland v. Wilson,
519 U.S. 408 (1997). In other cases, neither a certiorari petition nor a brief in opposition was
available on Westlaw. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S.
266 (2000); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113
(1999); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1999); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997);
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
176 See Bruhl, supra note 134, at 372–75.
177 Id. at 375. Having conducted the research for this study, I can attest to the enormity of
the commitment required for this process.
178 Id. at 375–76; Cummins, Aft, & Cumby, supra note 145, at 391.
179 In some cases, a petition for certiorari asserted a split of lower court authority, and the
brief in opposition conceded the existence of the split. Compare, e.g., Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 7, Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011), 2010 WL 2937720, at *7 (asserting the existence of a lower court split), with Brief for the United States in Opposition at 9,
Davis v. United States, 546 U.S. 229 (2011), 2010 WL 4278711, at *9 (accepting the existence
of a split among lower courts, but arguing that the case was a poor vehicle for resolving the
split).
180 To some extent, objective truth in such an inquiry is inherently elusive. The existence
or non-existence of a split (as well as which lower courts have lined up on either side of an
issue) can depend on the level of generality at which one views the question. See Bruhl, supra
note 134, at 378 n.42; Summers & Newman, supra note 138, at 2 (describing these tasks as
“more art than science”). In an attempt to provide an objective guidepost for these inquiries, I
referred to the questions on which the Court accepted certiorari. Nonetheless, this did not
entirely eliminate subjectivity from the process.
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After choosing a methodology for identifying Supreme Court cases
in which more than one lower court had ruled on the issue, one must also
select criteria for counting the lower court decisions associated with
those Supreme Court cases. As with the question of how to identify relevant Supreme Court cases, one must decide which sources to consult.
That choice generates further questions. For reasons similar to those I
have described above, some studies have chosen to treat the Supreme
Court’s opinions as definitive and to eschew reference to extrinsic materials like briefs and lower court opinions.181 Largely because I hoped to
generate a more robust data set, I chose, once again, to consult a broader
range of sources, including briefs, the lower court decisions being reviewed by the Court, and other lower court decisions asserted to have
addressed the relevant questions. My decision to consult these extrinsic
materials, as opposed to simply counting any lower court decisions mentioned in Supreme Court opinions, required that I make additional
choices about how to count those decisions. First, one must decide
whether to count unpublished opinions.182 I opted to count unpublished
opinions unless the unpublished opinion conflicted with an earlier, published opinion by the same court. One must also determine a method for
dealing with intra-jurisdictional conflict.183 I counted the most recent decision as the position of the jurisdiction in question, unless the most recent decision was unpublished and conflicted with an earlier, published
decision by the same court. In assessing the positions of lower courts,
one must also decide whether to count statements that might be classified
as dicta.184 I counted any unequivocal statement taking a position on the
relevant issue as a position of the lower court, whether or not the statement was essential to the court’s holding.
As with my classification of Supreme Court cases as involving more
than one lower court decision on the issue, my documentation of how
lower courts lined up on those issues required that I make some subjective judgments. Once again, I began with the Supreme Court opinions
themselves. However, even when the Court listed some lower court decisions, I supplemented the inquiry with reference to filings associated
with the case. When the parties disagreed about the nature of the lower
court lineup, I went beyond those filings to read lower court decisions to
assess, independently, how lower courts had dealt with the questions at
hand. While I hope that my consultation of additional sources served to
181 See Cummins, Aft, & Cumby, supra note 145, at 391; Summers & Newman, supra
note 138, at 2. The Supreme Court Database does not attempt to measure the way lower courts
lined up on issues the Supreme Court later reviewed, even for cases it codes as involving
splits. Bruhl, supra note 134, at 377.
182 Bruhl, supra note 134, at 376–77.
183 Id. at 378.
184 See id.
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counteract any systematic bias in the Court’s opinions, this process, once
again, added additional layers of subjectivity. Although I hoped to avoid
systematic bias in this process by consulting multiple sources, including
the briefs of parties with opposing interests, I ultimately had to make my
own judgments when those sources conflicted with each other. If my
judgments were systematically biased, that bias would, of course, affect
the results.
Although this relatively exhaustive approach should produce more
complete results than consultation only of Supreme Court opinions, one
cannot count on the method to provide truly comprehensive results. As
Professor Bruhl has noted, the Supreme Court often purports to provide
only examples of lower court cases, even when it does mention that more
than one lower court has addressed the current issue.185 Likewise, the
parties sometimes explicitly offer only examples when they characterize
lower court positions.186 Nonetheless, one would expect this approach to
provide a more robust data set than one could obtain with reference only
to the Court’s opinions.
I departed from this process of tallying lower court decisions in only
one significant way. For some cases, it was apparent not only that the
Court and the parties had failed to detail comprehensively the lineup of
lower courts, but one could also say with confidence that significant
numbers of other courts had weighed in on the question, and one could
easily identify the position the vast majority of lower courts had taken.
This situation arose in seven Supreme Court cases in the data set.187 In
six of those cases, the lower court decision the Supreme Court was reviewing simply disregarded clear Supreme Court precedent.188 Thus, in
185

Bruhl, supra note 134, at 377.
See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6–7, Illinois v. Caballes, 2003 WL
23119168.
187 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009); Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635 (2002); United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11 (1999); Maryland
v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999).
188 Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (creating restrictions on search incident to arrest of an automobile
and effectively overruling New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), while refusing to acknowledge the Court was doing so); Kirk, 536 U.S. 635 (overturning the decision of a Louisiana court that had held probable cause alone sufficient to validate arrest in the home, ignoring
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)); Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (overturning a Ninth Circuit
decision failing to follow the Court’s guidance on evaluation of the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether the facts provided the government with reasonable suspicion);
Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (overturning the Arkansas Supreme Court’s refusal to follow Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), in part because the Arkansas court believed it had the
authority to interpret the United States Constitution as providing greater protection than the
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation would provide); Flippo, 528 U.S. 11 (overturning state court determination that search of a crime scene was authorized without a warrant, in
violation of Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)); Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (overturning state
court ruling that police may not search an automobile without a separate finding of exigent
186
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these cases, although neither the parties nor the Court attempted anything
like a comprehensive account of lower court dispositions on the issue,
the outlier status of the lower court whose decision was under review
was obvious. In these cases, I attempted a rough approximation of the
lineup of lower courts by assuming a total of twenty-five lower courts
had ruled on the issue and assigning a ratio of either twenty-four to one
or twenty-two to three, depending on whether it appeared that only one
lower court had taken the outlying position or, alternatively, that a small
handful of lower courts seemed to have taken that position.
While these figures were somewhat arbitrary, I believe they represent conservative estimates for two reasons. First, the issues in question in these cases tended to be routine Fourth Amendment matters that
one would expect most lower courts to confront with some regularity.
Second, because of the clarity with which the Supreme Court had already
spoken in most of the cases in question, there was little doubt that the
vast majority of lower courts were already following the Court’s precedent without trouble. There is also reason to believe that inclusion of
estimates for these cases enriches the data set by making it more representative of the Fourth Amendment issues that lower courts regularly
confront. While typical Supreme Court cases tend to involve the most
difficult issues, which divide lower courts and thus require Supreme
Court intervention, six of these seven cases presented problems that, in
theory, should have been easier for lower courts to resolve. Adding estimates of lower court lineups for some of these routine, easier problems
makes the data set more representative than one composed entirely of the
most difficult and divisive issues. Nonetheless, in recognition of the novelty of this approach, and in order to ensure a closer basis for comparison
with previous studies, I also kept a separate tally of cases in which my
data collection did not require this kind of approximation.
In addition to tracking the performance of lower courts on Fourth
Amendment issues the Court reviewed, I used the Supreme Court
Database and Westlaw to estimate the frequency with which the Court
resolved Fourth Amendment issues, as compared with other constitutional questions. The frequency with which the Court believes that complex issues that have divided lower courts are important enough to
require definitive resolution gives additional information about the coherence of the Court’s earlier decisions. As I have discussed, this information still leaves one with an incomplete picture of the coherence of
Supreme Court decision-making, but it does enrich the inquiry. Furthermore, authors have relied in the past on superficial examination of the
frequency with which the Court intervenes on Fourth Amendment quescircumstances, in addition to probable cause, in disregard of the Court’s holding in Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996)).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\26-2\CJP202.txt

312

CORNELL JOURNAL

unknown

OF

LAW

AND

Seq: 38

PUBLIC POLICY

8-MAY-17

9:17

[Vol. 26:275

tions to marshal support for the argument that the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is incoherent.189
For each Fourth Amendment case, I also kept a tally of the process
the Court used to derive its holding. Specifically, I characterized each
case either as one in which the Court primarily used an open-ended balancing process, one in which the Court used a more constrained form of
analogical reasoning from precedent, or one involving a mixed process.190 The Court is likely to engage in balancing to determine Fourth
Amendment reasonableness when no clear rule from a previous case
governs the situation.191 Such balancing suggests either that the Court
has never addressed the issue in question, or, alternatively, that it has
expressly decided the problem should be solved through case-by-case
adjudication. On the other hand, if the Supreme Court believed its precedent controlled the outcome of a case, or if closely analogous cases at
least suggested the correct disposition of the current issue, lower courts,
like the Supreme Court, would be likely to have relied on that same precedent. In other words, the process the Court uses to reach its conclusions in any given case gives an indication of the kind of guidance the
Court has previously offered on the issue at hand.192 Thus, accounting
189 See Bradley, supra note 2, at 1468 (noting that, in the most recent five terms at the
time of the article’s publication, the Court had decided thirty-five Fourth Amendment cases);
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 49 (1974)
(asserting that the fact that the Court had issued sixteen major Fourth Amendment opinions in
the previous five terms illustrated that the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was “unstable and unconvincing”).
190 As with other coding decisions in this study, coding these cases required that I make
some subjective determinations with which others might reasonably disagree. For example, in
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), the Court considered the question of the existence of
reasonable suspicion to be essentially determined by its previous pronouncements on the matter. See id. at 269–72 (citing and distinguishing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), and Alabama v. White, 469 U.S. 325 (1990)). However, in
response to the state’s argument that the Court should modify the Terry standard, the Court
discussed both the dangers presented by firearms and the ease with which anyone could set in
motion embarrassing, intrusive searches of other citizens were the Court to loosen Terry’s
requirements for establishing reasonable suspicion. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272–73. Nonetheless,
because the Court did not explicitly state that it was engaging in a balancing process, and
because the Court had already determined that Terry, Adams, and White decided the outcome
of the case, I coded J.L. as a case involving analogical reasoning rather than balancing.
191 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (stating that, in the absence
of precise guidance from the founding era, the Court will decide whether to exempt a search
from the warrant requirement by balancing the degree to which government conduct is necessary to promote legitimate law enforcement interests against the severity of the privacy intrusion); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999) (stating that the Court will
engage in balancing to determine Fourth Amendment reasonableness when the common law
during the founding era provides no clear answer); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (“There is no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize)
against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.”) (citation omitted).
192 This inquiry is far from a perfect gauge of the character of the Court’s previous guidance. For example, the Court might balance in a case in which a previous, seemingly categor-

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\26-2\CJP202.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 39

FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

8-MAY-17

9:17

313

for the process the Court uses to reach its conclusions provides an opportunity to assess whether attempting to create mechanical rules to govern
future situations or leaving Fourth Amendment reasonableness determinations to case-by-case balancing based on the totality of the circumstances best promotes coherence in Fourth Amendment law.193 If lower
courts were more likely to get the “right” answers in cases in which the
Supreme Court believed precedent controlled the outcome, that fact
would suggest that, if coherence is the Court’s priority, it should attempt
to craft bright-line rules when possible.
It is worth distinguishing the foregoing inquiry, which involves the
process by which the Court derives the directives it issues in each case,
from the nature of those directives themselves. For example, if the Court
has never addressed the question of whether police may detain occupants
of a residence while executing a search warrant, it might balance to deical rule appeared to govern facts the Court determines to be distinguishable, rather than
because the Court had failed to address the issue entirely or because it deliberately left the
issue open to case-by-case balancing. In Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), the Court
balanced to reach its conclusion that police should not be authorized to search the digital
contents of a cell phone incident to arrest, distinguishing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973). However, before Riley, several lower courts had relied on Robinson as providing
a categorical rule authorizing such searches, without any reason to distinguish the digital contents of cell phones from other items police might discover and seize from a person during an
arrest. See United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411–12 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 510 (Cal. 2011).
Despite the coarse nature of the metric, however, I believe this inquiry provides a reasonable,
rough estimate of the character of the Court’s prior pronouncements on an issue. In each case
in which the Court relies primarily on balancing, it does so because it believes prior law
offered no definitive resolution to the problem under review.
193 Despite the Court’s periodic insistence that clear rules are necessary to provide adequate guidance to police officers, the question of whether, and under what conditions, such
rules promote clarity has been subject to longstanding debate. In 1985, Professor Bradley argued that the Court’s numerous, fact-bound Fourth Amendment rules creating exceptions to
the warrant requirement generated confusion because such rules tend to break down, requiring
constant qualification and refinement when slightly different facts suggest the governing rule
would produce unreasonable results. Bradley, supra note 2, at 1484–85. As discussed above,
for Bradley the solution lay either in embracing an open-ended, case-by-case reasonableness
test for all Fourth Amendment questions or, alternatively, in enforcing a single, bright-line rule
that warrants are always required when police conduct Fourth Amendment searches and
seizures, except in cases of true emergency. Professor Wayne Lafave suggested the Court
should adopt bright-line rules in the Fourth Amendment context when 1) the rule has clear
boundaries that obviate the need for case-by-case adjudication; 2) application of the rule produces results that approximate those that would be obtained if case-by-case evaluation were
feasible; 3) case-by-case adjudication of the underlying principle the rule effectuates has
proved unworkable; 4) the rule is not easily subject to manipulation and abuse. Wayne R.
LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing ‘Bright Lines’ and
‘Good Faith,’ 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 325–26 (1982); see also Andrew McLetchie, Note, The
Case for Bright-Line Rules in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: Adopting the Tenth Circuit’s
Bright-Line Test for Determining the Voluntariness of Consent, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 225,
233–34 (2001) (discussing the Court’s use of bright-line rules in some areas of Fourth Amendment law and its requirement of case-by-case analysis in other areas, and examining factors
likely behind the Court’s choices).
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cide whether such conduct is reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.194 At the end of that balancing process, however, the Court must
issue a directive to govern future cases. That directive might take the
form of an open-ended standard, such as a decree that police may detain
the occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant when,
under the totality of the circumstances, it is reasonable to do so. Alternatively, the Court might determine, through its balancing of interests, that
police have categorical authority to detain occupants in these circumstances.195 While the process the Court uses to derive its directive provides some insight into the sort of instruction the Court had previously
offered on the issue in question, the nature of the directive the Court
ultimately issues to decide the case is less useful in that regard; for example, the fact of balancing suggests no clear rule governed the issue before
the case at hand, but if, through that balancing process, the Court decides
to issue a directive in the form of a bright-line rule instead of an openended standard, that fact would reveal little about the legal environment
in which lower courts operated before the Court took up the present case.
I kept a separate tally of the nature of the directive the Court ultimately
issued in each of the cases in the data set.196
194

See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
See Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1043 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that the Summers Court balanced to arrive at its decision, but asserting that the holding
of Summers was a bright-line rule).
196 Once again, coding these cases required the use of some subjective judgments on my
part. In their platonic forms, rules and standards are easily distinguishable. A bright-line rule,
in theory, provides a precise, clearly delineated formula that limits the decision-maker’s discretion in an attempt to effectuate, indirectly, some underlying policy choice. For example, a
rule that one must be at least eighteen years old in order to be eligible to vote provides a
straightforward, binary choice to one tasked with deciding the eligibility of an applicant, and
the rule is intended to implement the underlying policy judgment that only people who are
intellectually mature enough to make informed choices should be permitted to vote. A standard, on the other hand, is an open-ended directive that allows the decision-maker to apply the
underlying policy judgment directly. Such a standard in this example would require some
government functionary to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether a citizen applying for
voting privileges had attained the requisite level of maturity. In practice, however, directives
often fall on a continuum between pure rules and standards, and even a seemingly straightforward rule might leave significant discretionary judgments to be made. In this regard, in cases
in which the characterization presented obvious complexities, I attempted to compare the nature of the competing directives under consideration, and I made a judgment about which
directive was more rule-like and which was more standard-like. For example, in Bailey v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, the Court’s determination that police executing a search warrant at a residence may detain occupants as a matter of course only if such occupants are in the
“immediate vicinity” of the residence was certainly more rule-like than the dissent’s proposed
open-ended balancing to determine the reasonableness of such detentions. See id. at 1043
(Scalia, J., concurring). Nonetheless, Justice Scalia’s characterization of the Court’s directive
as a “straightforward, binary inquiry” arguably over-stated the rule-like quality of the directive. See id. As the Court noted, a multi-factor test would be necessary in close cases to determine whether an occupant was in the immediate vicinity, “including the lawful limits of the
premises, whether the occupant was within the line of sight of his dwelling, the ease of reentry
195
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Finally, because several authors have recommended the use of positive law as a guide to Fourth Amendment reasonableness, at least in part
as a means of making Fourth Amendment law more coherent, and because the Court has, in recent years, adopted a kind of positive law
model for evaluating the applicability of the Fourth Amendment, I kept
track of Supreme Court decisions that invoked positive law to support
the outcome of the case. I hoped that analysis of the Court’s invocations
of positive law might provide some basis for evaluation of claims about
the manner in which the Court uses positive law to inform its decisionmaking.
III. RESULTS
Using the criteria I have described resulted in a data set of seventythree Supreme Court cases during the twenty-year period under review in
which the Court resolved a substantive Fourth Amendment claim.197 I
was able to verify that more than one lower court had ruled on the relevant issue in advance of the Supreme Court in fifty-one of these cases,
which represents 69.86% of the data set. Interestingly, this is virtually
identical to the estimates by sophisticated observers of the percentage of
cases the Court accepts in which the issue had divided lower courts.198
The remaining twenty-two cases often involved narrow issues that were
too intertwined with the idiosyncratic facts of the case for more than one
lower court to have been likely to have addressed the specific question
before the Court.199
from the occupant’s location, and other relevant factors.” Id. at 1042. Thus, the Court’s ostensibly bright-line rule regarding the immediate vicinity nonetheless requires a standard-like inquiry to determine what “immediate vicinity” means in any given case. As the dissent pointed
out, “The majority’s line invites case-by-case litigation although, divorced as it is from interests that directly motivate the Fourth Amendment, it offers no clear case-by-case guidance.”
Id. at 1047 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Despite this, because the majority’s directive was clearly
more rule-like than the dissent’s proposal, I characterized the directive as a rule.
197 I counted Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999), and Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603
(1999), which addressed the same Fourth Amendment issue, and which the Court decided on
the same day, as a single case involving two lower court decisions.
198 See Ginsburg, supra note 134, at 521; Stras, supra note 134, at 981.
199 See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) (deciding that, under the facts
of the case, officers would reasonably have concluded that Respondent’s decedent intended to
resume dangerous, high-speed chase, and officers were justified in using deadly force); Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009) (deciding that, under the facts of the case, exigent circumstances justified a departure from the warrant requirement); Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v.
Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (deciding that a school strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl in
an attempt to find prescription-strength ibuprofen, which the school had no reason to believe
the girl was hiding in her underwear, was unreasonable); Los Angeles Cty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S.
609 (2007) (deciding that police executing a search warrant acted reasonably when they ordered naked residents out of bed, despite the fact that residents were Caucasian and suspects
were African American); Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003) (deciding, under the facts of
the case, that seventeen-year-old boy had been arrested for Fourth Amendment purposes and
that confession was a fruit of the arrest); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997) (finding
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Of the seventy-three cases, the Court affirmed the substantive
Fourth Amendment position of the court or courts directly below only
34.6% of the time.200 Thus, using this traditional measure of lower court
performance would suggest, as has been the case in all fields, that lower
courts infrequently answer difficult Fourth Amendment problems correctly. Focusing on cases in which more than one lower court had ruled
on the issue, however, presents quite a different picture.
Of the fifty-one cases in which more than one lower court had addressed the question under review, the Court sided with the majority of
lower courts twenty-six times. The Court sided with the minority of
lower courts twenty times. In five cases, lower courts were evenly divided. I believe the most accurate way to represent cases in which lower
courts were evenly split is to count such cases as a half-victory for each
side. Thus, using this measure resulted in 28.5 cases in which the Court
sided with the majority of lower courts—55.88% of the fifty-one cases.
This is very close to the figures derived through evaluation of studies by
Tom Cummins and Adam Aft, which examined the full Supreme Court
merits docket for the October 2010, October 2011, and October 2012
terms,201 and of John Summers and Michael Newman, who examined the
October 2005 through the October 2010 terms.202
Cummins and Aft presented the results of their first two studies as
showing that the Court agreed with the majority of lower courts ninety
percent of the time and sixty-eight percent of the time for the 2010 and
2011 terms respectively.203 However, as they acknowledged, Cummins
and Aft counted even splits as cases in which the Supreme Court sided
with the majority of lower courts, analogizing to the baseball rule that
Georgia law conditioning candidacy for state office on completion of a drug test unreasonable,
and noting that Georgia was the only state to have such a requirement).
200 This figure includes two lower court decisions under direct review in California v.
Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), and both lower courts from Hanlon and Wilson. Additionally,
because I focused on whether the Court agreed with the lower courts’ substantive Fourth
Amendment conclusions and excluded analysis of whether the Court agreed with a lower court
position on qualified immunity, I counted Hanlon and Safford Unified School District #1 v.
Redding as affirming the lower court in question, though that was not the Court’s formal
disposition in either case. In Hanlon, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment because,
although the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s determination that police allowing members
of the media to accompany them while executing a search warrant at a residence violated the
Fourth Amendment, the Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. In Safford, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part; the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the strip search of a
thirteen-year-old girl to look for prescription-strength ibuprofen violated the Fourth Amendment, but the Court disagreed with the lower court’s determination that defendants were not
entitled to qualified immunity.
201 See Cummins, Aft, & Cumby, supra note 145; Cummins & Aft, Appellate Review II,
supra note 145; Cummins & Aft, supra note 142.
202 Summers & Newman, supra note 138.
203 Cummins & Aft, Appellate Review II, supra note 145, at 38.
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ties go to the runner.204 Reevaluating the data from the first two Cummins and Aft studies using my methodology shows the Court siding with
lower court majorities 73.68% of the time for the 2010 term and 56.82%
of the time for the 2011 term.205 For their study of the 2012 term, Cummins and Aft, joined by Joshua Cumby, simply presented the raw data.
Evaluation of that data using my methodology shows the Court sided
with lower court majorities 51.85% of the time during the 2012 term.206
Assessment of the data from each of the three Cummins and Aft studies
with my methodology reveals that the Court agreed with lower court majorities during the 2010 through 2012 terms in 40.5 out of sixty-eight
cases, or 59.56% of the time.207
Summers and Newman catalogued 172 Supreme Court cases involving more than one lower court decision between 2005 and 2010.208
Of those cases, Summers and Newman noted that forty-two involved an
even division among lower courts and observed that the Court agreed
with the majority approach among lower courts in 51.5% of the remaining 130 cases.209 Using my methodology to assess this data results in a
finding that the Court agreed with lower court majorities 51.2% of the
time during those years.
Thus, the 55.88% rate of Supreme Court agreement with lower
court majorities for twenty years of Fourth Amendment decisions falls
squarely between the Summers and Newman figure and the figure from
the Cummins, Aft, and Cumby studies. One cannot draw definitive conclusions from this; as I have described above, my methodology for cataloguing Supreme Court cases and lower court decisions differs from the
other studies, and the possibility of systematic bias in my data collection,
or in the methods used by other researchers, should lead to circumspection. Additionally, my twenty-year study covers a larger time period than
the three years Cummins and Aft evaluated or the six years Summers and
Newman examined. Nonetheless, one might draw a tentative conclusion
from these comparisons that the likelihood of lower courts getting the
right answers in Fourth Amendment cases is about the same as the likelihood that lower courts will get the right answers to questions the Supreme Court chooses to address in general.
Examination of lower court decisions associated with the fifty-one
Supreme Court cases yields similar results. For the forty-four cases in
204

Id. at 38 n.10; Cummins & Aft, supra note 142, at 61 n.17.
See Cummins & Aft, Appellate Review II, supra note 145, at 38 n.10; Cummins & Aft,
supra note 142, at app. Table 3.
206 See Cummins, Aft, & Cumby, supra note 145, at 397 app. B.
207 See id. at 397 app. B; Cummins & Aft, Appellate Review II, supra note 145, at 38
n.10; Cummins & Aft, supra note 142, at app. Table 3.
208 Summers & Newman, supra note 138, at 4.
209 Id.
205
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which I counted lower court decisions individually, I counted 370 lower
court decisions, of which 194 lower courts reached conclusions the Supreme Court would later determine to be correct. This 52.43% rate of
agreement is virtually identical to the figure one can extract through
analysis of the three studies by Cummins and Aft. Evaluation of each of
those studies reveals a total of 338 lower court decisions, of which 178
lower courts got the “right” answers, a 52.66% agreement rate.210 Likewise, the Summers and Newman research showed the Supreme Court
affirmed, directly or indirectly, the decisions of lower courts 51.7% of
the time in Supreme Court cases involving more than one lower court
decision between 2005 and 2010.211 Finally, Eric Hansford’s analysis of
385 lower court decisions associated with splits the Supreme Court reviewed between 2005 and 2008 showed a 54% agreement rate.212
Including my estimates for the seven cases in which it was clear
both that a significant number of courts not listed individually in the
Supreme Court opinions or briefs had addressed the issue, and that there
was a heavily lopsided majority among those courts, leads to the conclusion that the Supreme Court directly or indirectly affirmed 320 of 545
lower court decisions, a 58.7% rate of agreement. As I have noted, including these estimates provides a more complete picture of lower court
performance because it offers a glimpse of the likely universe of more
typical cases in which lower courts largely agree with each other and the
Supreme Court never intervenes. If I had made more conservative estimates in these cases, the percentage would change somewhat. For example, if I had estimated a total of ten lower court decisions for each of
these cases instead of twenty-five lower court decisions, while continuing to treat the minority position as associated with either one or three
decisions, depending on whether it appeared that only one or a few
courts supported the outlying position, I would have concluded that 245
of 440 lower court decisions got the right answers for all fifty-one Supreme Court cases involving more than one lower court decision, a
55.68% rate of agreement.
Of course, it takes additional inferential leaps to get from a tentative
conclusion that lower courts reach the correct results in Fourth Amend210 See Cummins, Aft, & Cumby, supra note 145, at 394 (revealing that, for the 2012
Supreme Court term, the Court directly or indirectly affirmed fifty-one of 101 circuit court
decisions in Supreme Court cases involving circuit splits); Cummins & Aft, Appellate Review
II, supra note 145, app. at 46 tbl.1 (revealing that, for the 2011 Supreme Court term, the Court
directly or indirectly affirmed fifty-three of 121 circuit court decisions in Supreme Court cases
involving circuit splits); Cummins & Aft, Appellate Review, supra note 142, app. at 74 tbl.1
(revealing that, for the 2010 Supreme Court term, the Court directly or indirectly affirmed
seventy-four of 116 circuit court decisions in Supreme Court cases involving circuit splits).
211 See Summers & Newman, supra note 138, at 3.
212 Hansford, supra note 145, at 1165.

R

R
R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\26-2\CJP202.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 45

FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

8-MAY-17

9:17

319

ment cases about as often as they do in other realms to a conclusion that
Supreme Court decision-making on the Fourth Amendment is as coherent as its decision-making as a whole. As I have discussed above, other
factors besides the clarity of previous Supreme Court pronouncements
might explain agreement between lower courts and the Supreme Court,
though I believe the evidence suggests such agreement largely reflects
the coherence of the Court’s jurisprudence. Additionally, as I have discussed, given the Court’s tendency to grant certiorari to resolve the most
difficult, divisive, and important issues, it is worth examining how often
the Court feels compelled to review Fourth Amendment issues, as compared with issues in other areas of the law. Even if lower courts perform
as well on Fourth Amendment issues the Court reviews as they do in
other areas of law, if the Supreme Court decides Fourth Amendment issues more frequently than it decides cases in other realms, that fact might
reflect greater confusion among lower courts and, thus, greater incoherence in the Supreme Court’s previous opinions in the field. As I have
discussed, this is not the only conclusion one might draw from a finding
that the Court decides a disproportionate number of Fourth Amendment
cases. One might also expect this result if government conduct implicates
citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights with greater frequency than other
rights, thus creating more opportunities for litigation and, consequently,
for division among lower courts.213 Nonetheless, because this inquiry
adds additional information, and because other authors have used the frequency of Fourth Amendment litigation in the Supreme Court to assert
the incoherence of the Court’s jurisprudence in the field,214 it is worth
undertaking.
Setting the October 1967 term, during which the Court decided
Katz, as the beginning of the modern era of Fourth Amendment law provides a useful benchmark for this analysis, in part because numerous
commentators have attributed the incoherence of Fourth Amendment law
to the indeterminacy of the Katz test.215 The Supreme Court Database
codes 234 Supreme Court decisions as involving Fourth Amendment issues between the beginning of the October 1967 term and the end of the
October 2014 term, the last term for which data were available at the
time of writing. By way of comparison, using the Westlaw database of
Supreme Court cases, I searched for cases during the same time period in
which “Fourth Amendment” appeared in the digest. The search resulted
in 271 cases.
During this period, the Supreme Court Database lists a total of
5,979 Supreme Court cases, making search and seizure cases just 3.91%
213
214
215

See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
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of the overall docket using the Database’s figure for Fourth Amendment
cases. The Database counts 1,227 of these cases as involving criminal
procedure, other than cases the Database codes as involving statutory
construction of criminal laws or sub-constitutional issues. Thus, using
either the Database’s count of search and seizure cases or the Westlaw
figure, Fourth Amendment cases make up only about twenty percent of
all non-statutory criminal procedure cases during the forty-eight-year period. A focus on cases involving Sixth Amendment claims shows 182
cases between the 1967 and 2014 terms, using the Supreme Court
Database. Similarly, “Sixth Amendment” appears in the Westlaw digest
during that period in 177 Supreme Court cases. For Fifth Amendment
cases other than those involving the Takings Clause, the Supreme Court
database includes 258 cases between October of 1967 and June of
2015.216 Westlaw’s Supreme Court database includes 271 cases during
those years in which “Fifth Amendment” appears in the digest. Thus,
Fourth Amendment cases are a small percentage not only of the Court’s
docket, but also of the Court’s constitutional criminal procedure cases.
Furthermore, the Court seems to review about as many Fifth Amendment
criminal procedure cases as Fourth Amendment cases, despite the fact
that government conduct implicates the Fourth Amendment with much
greater frequency than it implicates the Fifth Amendment.
Examination of cases outside of criminal procedure is also revealing. The Supreme Court Database indicates that 458 cases involved
First Amendment issues between the beginning of the 1967 term and the
end of the 2014 term. Similarly, the Westlaw Supreme Court database
includes 476 cases during that period in which “First Amendment” appears in the digest. The Westlaw database shows 395 Supreme Court
cases in which “equal protection” appears in the digest during these
years, and the Supreme Court Database codes 239 cases as involving
either Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims. The Supreme Court Database also indicates that 283 cases involved federalism
issues during the forty-eighty terms. Overall, then, the frequency of Supreme Court litigation of Fourth Amendment issues does not seem to
lend support to the notion that Fourth Amendment law is particularly
incoherent, at least as compared with other major areas of law.
Of course, this modest evidence for the relative parity between the
coherence of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and its decision-making in other realms does not prove there is no room for im216 See Spaeth et al., supra note 152. Some of the results from this search would include
equal protection and due process arguments in non-criminal cases. A search of the Database
for criminal procedure sub-issues typically associated with Fifth Amendment claims (including
double jeopardy, involuntary confession, Miranda warnings, plea bargaining, and self-incrimination) yields 255 results for the 1967 to 2014 terms.
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provement in the Court’s Fourth Amendment decision-making, or even
that Fourth Amendment law is terribly coherent in an absolute sense.
Even if one finds this evidence to be a useful indication that Fourth
Amendment law is not particularly incoherent, as compared with other
areas of law, one might respond that all or most of the Supreme Court’s
decision-making is incoherent and that all of it should be improved.217
To the extent that the evidence provides a moderate demonstration of
Fourth Amendment coherence, it also cannot validate any particular theory, such as those Professor Kerr has offered, explaining how specific
overarching principles consistently explain the Court’s Fourth Amendment decision-making. Nonetheless, this attempt at systematic evaluation
of the coherence of Fourth Amendment law should provide some additional context for evaluating the near unanimous, long-term, fervent assertions of Fourth Amendment incoherence based almost solely on
qualitative analysis of Supreme Court opinions. And if one is unprepared
to accept that most or all Supreme Court decision-making in most fields
is incoherent, one might begin to be more open, if not to the specific
claims of Professor Kerr, at least to the possibility that the Court draws
on some overarching set of principles in deciding Fourth Amendment
cases that gives lower courts somewhat clearer guidance than the consensus among scholars has previously suggested.
Beyond this, I hope this Study might offer some insight on the kind
of decision-making that best promotes clarity in Fourth Amendment law.
Because of the longstanding academic discussion of whether open-ended
balancing or bright-line rules best promote clarity in Fourth Amendment
law,218 and because the Court has veered back and forth between the two
approaches,219 I chose to investigate the possibility of a correlation be217 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2, at 1472–73 (“Confusion in the law is not unique to
the fourth amendment [sic], of course, but it is a particularly serious problem in this area
because the exclusionary remedy for fourth amendment [sic] violations does not make whole
the criminal defendant whose rights have been violated—nothing can ‘unsearch’ his house—
and does nothing at all for an innocent victim of an illegal search, who derives no benefit from
evidentiary exclusion.”).
218 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2.
219 Compare, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (“We have long held that the
‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’ Reasonableness, in turn, is measured
in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.”) (citation omitted), and
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“There is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or
seizure) entails.’”) (citation omitted), with Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 366
(2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The majority insists that a bright-line rule focused on probable cause is necessary to vindicate the State’s interest in easily administrable law enforcement
rules.”), and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 469 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The
Court seeks to justify its departure from the principles underlying Chimel by proclaiming the
need for a new “bright-line” rule to guide the officer in the field.”); see also Fourth Amendment—Trespass Test—Florida v. Jardines, 127 HARV. L. REV. 228, 228 (2012) (“The rigidity
of the Jones test, which automatically makes physical trespass a de facto-unreasonable search,
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tween lower court performance and the kind of directive (a rule or an
open-ended standard) the Supreme Court has given those courts in advance of their resolution of the issues in question. As I have described
above, I believe the process the Supreme Court uses to resolve a case
provides some indication of the kind of guidance the Court has offered
before on the question before the Court. If the Court explicitly balances
to reach its holding, that is some indication that the Court had previously
left the issue to case-by-case balancing, either expressly or implicitly, by
failing to address the issue at all. Alternatively, if the Court uses a more
constrained form of analogical reasoning from precedent, that fact suggests the Court believes previous rules, on which lower courts would also
be likely to have relied, determined the outcome.
In fact, there does appear to be a correlation between the kind of
reasoning the Court uses to reach its conclusions in Fourth Amendment
cases and the likelihood that lower courts reached the “right” answers in
advance of the Court’s decisions. First, among the forty-six Supreme
Court cases in which more than one lower court had previously ruled and
in which lower courts were not evenly divided, the Supreme Court affirmed the majority position among lower courts in twenty of twentynine cases that I coded as involving analogical reasoning by the Court.
On the other hand, the Court affirmed the position of the majority of
lower courts in only five of thirteen cases I coded as balancing cases.
Among cases I coded as involving a mixed process, the Court affirmed
the majority lower court position in one case and rejected that position in
three cases. Using a logistic regression model to test the significance of
the Court’s use of analogical reasoning or balancing as a predictor of
whether the Court would side with a lower court majority showed significance at the .10 significance level.220 Thus, from this analysis alone, one
might conclude that a majority of lower courts is more likely to reach the
“right” conclusion when the Supreme Court provides bright-line rules to
guide judicial decision-making than when the Court leaves such decision-making to open-ended balancing.
A univariate logistic regression also showed significance at the .10
significance level of the percentage of lower courts taking the majority
position as a predictor of the Supreme Court siding with that position221;
the greater the portion of lower courts in a lower court majority, as a
percentage of all lower courts that had ruled on the issue, the more likely
the Supreme Court was to affirm the majority position. This, of course, is
is in tension with the hallmark of Fourth Amendment inquiry—reasonableness—as well as
with the Court’s longstanding use of balancing, rather than bright lines, to effectuate reasonableness inquiry.”).
220 A logistic regression showed the p-value for this variable was 0.052.
221 A logistic regression showed a p-value of 0.072 for this variable.
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what one would expect if the relative clarity of prior legal pronouncements causes more jurists at all levels to reach the same conclusions.
Interestingly, however, this effect was greatly moderated if the case was
a balancing case. Using a logistic regression model including both the
percentage of lower courts in the lower court majority and the Supreme
Court’s use of analogical reasoning or balancing to resolve the issue
showed both predictors to be statistically significant at the .10 significance level,222 and the model revealed that, in analogical cases, one
could predict a greater than fifty percent chance of the Supreme Court
affirming the lower court majority when a much smaller percentage of
courts were in the lower court majority than would be necessary for such
a prediction if the Supreme Court used balancing to resolve the case, as
represented in the figure below. Because the Court’s use of balancing
suggests the Court had failed to provide bright-line rules governing the
issue to lower courts before those courts addressed the issue at hand,
these results also suggest the Supreme Court should use bright-line rules
when possible if it wishes to foster the development of a legal environment in which lower courts are more likely to get the right answers to
Fourth Amendment questions.

222 In this model, the p-value for the variable represented by the percentage of lower
courts in the lower court majority was 0.079, and the p-value for the Court’s choice of analogical reasoning or balancing was 0.057.
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In fact, in most cases, the Court did ultimately adopt a rule-like
directive. In forty-seven of the seventy-three Supreme Court cases in the
Study, the Court embraced a rule-like directive to guide future courts and
law enforcement officers. In twenty-six cases, the Court selected a standard-like directive. It appears, therefore, that the Court frequently provides the kind of relatively straightforward guidance that can assist lower
courts in reaching conclusions the Court will deem correct in future
cases.
Finally, among the seventy-three Supreme Court cases, the majority
invoked some form of positive law in thirteen decisions to support its
ultimate conclusions. In other cases in the data set, the Court ignored
relevant positive law or explicitly rejected its use as a guide to the
Court’s determination of whether government conduct was reasonable.
The circumstances in which the Court embraced or rejected the use of
positive law reveal four contexts in which the Court has considered the
significance of some form of positive law. First, when no Supreme Court
precedent clearly governs the issue in question, the Court tends to look to
common law and statutes at the time of ratification to determine whether
the Framers would have considered the government’s conduct to be an
unlawful search or seizure.223 Second, as I have described in some detail
above, the Court in 2012 rehabilitated the property-based approach to
determining the applicability of the Fourth Amendment.224 Third, the
Court has, on occasion, considered broad patterns of state and local law
to inform its analysis. Fourth, the Court has typically judged the positive
law of the particular jurisdiction in which challenged government conduct arose to be irrelevant.
The Court’s willingness to rely on the first sort of positive law, late
eighteenth-century common law and statutes, is likely to increase the coherence of Fourth Amendment law only marginally at best. In the past
twenty years, the Court has deeply explored the state of the law at the
time of ratification to inform its Fourth Amendment analysis on only a
handful of occasions.225 The Court’s decisions suggest it is willing to
engage in detailed analysis of the law during the founding era only when
it believes that body of law might provide insight on the Framers’ disposition on the particular issue before the Court, rather than for guidance on
broader principles underlying the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.226
This alone limits the class of cases in which the Court would be likely to
223 Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S.
318, 326–27 (2001); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999).
224 See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.
225 See Moore, 553 U.S. at 168; Atwater, 532 US. at 326–27; Houghton, 526 U.S. at
299–300.
226 Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth
Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 897 (2002).
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undertake significant analysis of the law at the time of ratification.227
Additionally, because positive law, even at a particular point in history,
is not a monolith, but is likely to be in a state of some conflict,228 lower
courts are unlikely to be able to draw on this body of law to make consistent judgments about the Fourth Amendment’s requirements. Ultimately,
in each of the cases in which the Court has undertaken extensive examination of eighteenth-century law in the past twenty years, the Court supplemented its historical analysis with open-ended balancing,229 either
because the Court explicitly found the law at the time of ratification provided no clear answer to the issue in question,230 or because it apparently
lacked the courage of its stated conviction that eighteenth century law
provided a clear answer.231
The second kind of positive law on which the Court relies, the rehabilitated property approach to determining the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment, certainly has some potential to enhance the consistency and
predictability of Fourth Amendment law. As I have described above, Justice Scalia’s majority aptly asserted in Florida v. Jardines that a benefit
of using property rights as a baseline for determining the contours of
Fourth Amendment protection is that it “keeps easy cases easy.”232 That
is not to suggest that this approach eliminates all complexity or uncertainty from Fourth Amendment analysis. First, the model relies on property concepts only to determine the threshold question of whether
government conduct constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. It does not
purport to answer the question of whether such conduct, if it does impli-

227 For example, the law at the time of ratification would not have addressed issues related to technologies developed in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. See, e.g., Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (noting that the Court balances the government’s
need to advance legitimate law enforcement interests against the severity of privacy intrusions
in cases in which the law at the time of founding provides no clear answer, and moving directly to such balancing in case involving the constitutionality of searching the digital contents
of cell phones incident to arrest).
228 See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 332 (noting “disagreement, not unanimity” among jurists and
commentators from the founding era on the issue in question).
229 See Moore, 553 U.S. at 171–76; Atwater, 532 U.S. at 345–54; Houghton, 526 U.S. at
303–07.
230 Moore, 553 U.S. at 170–71.
231 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 311 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“To my knowledge, we have
never restricted ourselves to a two-step Fourth Amendment approach wherein the privacy and
governmental interests at stake must be considered only if 18th-century common law ‘yields
no answer.’ Neither the precedent cited by the Court, nor the majority’s opinion in this case,
mandate that approach. In a later discussion, the Court does attempt to address the contemporary privacy and governmental interests at issue in cases of this nature. Either the majority is
unconvinced by its own recitation of the historical materials, or it has determined that considering additional factors is appropriate in any event.”) (citations omitted).
232 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013).
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cate the Fourth Amendment, is reasonable.233 Second, reference to property concepts does not necessarily mean even the initial inquiry will be
easy in every case. As the Court declared in Jones, when the government
has not physically intruded into a constitutionally protected area to gather
information, constituting a per se search under the property approach,
reliance on Katz’s reasonable expectations of privacy test will still be
necessary.234 Furthermore, the question of whether the government has
physically intruded into a constitutionally protected area can itself be difficult to answer. Although the Jardines majority declared that the property-based formula for determining whether a Fourth Amendment search
has occurred “render[ed] the case a straightforward one,”235 the Court
was divided five to four on the question of whether a police officer with
a drug-sniffing dog has an implicit license to enter the curtilage of a
home for a brief period of time and, thus, whether such conduct constituted a search. Nonetheless, this approach does seem to have the potential to provide greater clarity to the law than an approach entirely
dependent on assessment of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of
privacy, more susceptible, in practice, to manipulation based on the subjective preferences of Supreme Court Justices.236 Overall, the Court has
relied on this approach three times since 2012.237
The Court has also, on occasion, looked to broad, nationwide patterns in contemporary law to support its conclusions on Fourth Amendment issues. During the twenty-year period I reviewed, the Court relied
on significant trends in state or municipal law to bolster its determinations on several occasions. In Missouri v. McNeely, in which the Court
rejected an argument that the fact of dissipation of alcohol in the blood
creates a per se exigency justifying departure from the warrant requirement, the Court asserted that it was “notable” that most states either
placed significant restrictions on non-consensual blood testing or prohibited the practice entirely.238 Likewise, in Maryland v. King, the Court, in
upholding a law permitting collection of DNA samples from some ar233 See U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (finding that the government had forfeited its alternative argument that the government’s conduct was reasonable for Fourth
Amendment purposes even if it did constitute a Fourth Amendment search).
234 Id. at 953.
235 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414.
236 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that judges applying Katz
are apt to “confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable
person to which the Katz test looks”); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
237 Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1370 (2015); Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414;
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953. In two other cases, the Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Jones. Cuevas-Perez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012); Pineda-Moreno
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012).
238 Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 n.9 (2013) (listing states that impose such
restrictions).
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restees, found it significant that most states and the federal government
had similar laws.239 In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada,
the Court also found it worth observing that that many states had stopand-identify statutes, that the Model Penal Code includes such a provision, and that the laws had roots in early English vagrancy laws.240 In
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, after examining the common law during
the founding era, the Court assessed the laws of contemporary American
jurisdictions in aid of its determination of whether a rule against misdemeanor arrests other than for breach of the peace had become “woven
. . . into the fabric of American law” after the founding era.241 In rejecting that notion, the Court observed that all fifty states and the District
of Columbia allowed warrantless misdemeanor arrests without breach of
the peace.242 Finally, in Chandler v. Miller, the Court observed that
Georgia was the only state that conditioned candidacy for public office
on a drug test.243 Notably, in each of these cases, the Court interpreted
the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections as being consistent
with the trend it had observed.
Yet the Court has tended to ignore trends in American law when
those trends fail to support the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment. For example, in Heien v. North Carolina, the Court mentioned several nineteenth-century cases to reinforce its conclusion that a
police officer’s reasonable mistake of law can provide a legitimate basis
for a detention.244 Yet in so doing, the Court neglected to mention the
dominant twentieth-century common law position rejecting that notion,245 despite the petitioner’s having made the Court aware of that
fact.246 In City of Los Angeles v. Patel, in finding an ordinance requiring
hotel operators to make their registers available for inspection, without
an opportunity for pre-compliance review, to be unconstitutional, the
Court ignored similar municipal laws in at least forty-one states.247 In
Samson v. California,248 the Court went further. Despite the fact that
“with only one or two arguable exceptions,” neither the federal government nor any other state besides California subjected parolees to suspi239

Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013).
542 U.S. 177, 182–83 (2004).
241 532 U.S. 318, 340 (2001) (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 933 (1995)).
242 Id. at 344.
243 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
244 135 S. Ct. 530, 537 (2014).
245 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 121 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (stating that an
officer’s mistake of law, other than as to the legitimacy of a statute or ordinance, cannot justify
an arrest); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 121 cmt. i. (AM. LAW INST. 1934).
246 Brief for Petitioner at 15, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014), 2014
WL2601475.
247 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2460 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (2015).
248 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
240
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cionless searches,249 the Court found that near consensus to be of “little
relevance.”250
Importantly, it is not easy to support all of the Court’s choices with
reference to the priorities Professor Kerr outlined for determining
whether positive law should be relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis.
For example, Kerr observed that a positive law model would be inappropriate in a case in which the law in question was designed to advance an
interest unrelated to privacy against intrusions by criminal investigators.251 Yet laws requiring reasonable suspicion to justify the search of a
parolee, which the Samson Court deemed irrelevant, were certainly intended to protect privacy interests. It is difficult to escape the conclusion
that the Court has, at least to some extent, invoked broad trends in contemporary American law when those trends support the Court’s inclinations, but that it has either ignored those trends or declared them
irrelevant when they contradict the Court’s preferences.
Lastly, the Court has fairly consistently rejected the idea that the
law of the particular jurisdiction in which challenged conduct occurred
should define the contours of Fourth Amendment protection. Virginia v.
Moore, in which the Court rejected the argument that Virginia’s choice
to prohibit arrest for certain misdemeanor offenses rendered arrests in
contravention of the law unconstitutional, typifies this approach. As the
Moore Court asserted, “[W]hether or not a search is reasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment’. . .has never ‘depend[ed] on the
law of the particular State in which the search occurs.’”252 In Whren v.
United States as well, the Court dismissed an argument that police officers acted unreasonably for Fourth Amendment purposes when they
stopped a car in contravention of local rules restricting the circumstances
in which plainclothes officers could conduct traffic stops.253
There is one notable exception to the Court’s tendency to disregard
the law of the jurisdiction in question; the Court does, of course, consider
the jurisdiction’s choice to classify conduct as criminal as relevant to its
Fourth Amendment analysis. Thus, in both Atwater and Moore, the Court
ruled arrests valid because police in each case had probable cause to
believe a crime had been committed.254 Likewise, in Illinois v. McAr249

Id. at 863 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 855.
251 See Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, supra note 89, at 533. To be
sure, Professor Kerr’s analysis applied explicitly only to the threshold question of whether
government conduct constitutes a search. Nonetheless, one can reasonably apply the priorities
he espoused for determining the relevance of positive law to inquiries into the reasonableness
of conduct already determined to implicate the Fourth Amendment as well.
252 553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (quoting California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988)).
253 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996).
254 Moore, 553 U.S. at 171; Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
250

R
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thur, the Court considered the fact that Illinois treated possession of marijuana as a criminal offense in assessing the state’s interests in
preventing a suspect from entering his home while police sought a warrant.255 The McArthur Court distinguished Welsh v. Wisconsin,256 in
which the Court had held Wisconsin lacked sufficient interest to justify
warrantless entry into a suspect’s home based on the possible loss of
evidence, in part because the state treated a first offense for driving under
the influence as a civil infraction.
Ultimately, other than the Court’s recent use of property concepts to
determine what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, the Court’s reliance on positive law has been either haphazard, limited in its potential
clarifying effect, or both. A more consistent, principled basis for drawing
on positive law to inform the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment might well contribute to a more coherent body of Fourth
Amendment law.257
CONCLUSION
The results of this Study do not suggest that Fourth Amendment law
requires no further refinement or reform. Scholars who have attacked the
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as incoherent have
tended also to have substantive critiques of the Court’s approach that
have been at least partly independent of the clarity, or lack thereof, of the
Court’s rulings. This Article does not address arguments that contemporary Fourth Amendment law fails, regardless of its coherence, to advance
substantive values the Amendment should promote.
Nonetheless, a large portion of critical commentary on Fourth
Amendment law has revolved, at least in part, around the notion that
Fourth Amendment law is a mess because the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence gives insufficient guidance for lower courts to
be able to figure out what the Supreme Court believes the Fourth
Amendment requires. This systematic study gives some additional context for evaluating those assertions. The results show that, in recent decades, lower courts have gotten the “right” answers to Fourth
Amendment questions more often than not, even on the kinds of complex, divisive issues the Supreme Court chooses to review. Because
255

531 U.S. 326, 336 (2001).
466 U.S. 740 (1984).
257 This is not to suggest that such a model would have no shortcomings. For example, as
Christopher Slobogin has conceded, reliance on surveys or, by implication, positive law, “does
smack of putting search and seizure law up for a vote, which runs against the constitutional
grain.” See Christopher Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion: A Response
to Kerr and Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588, 1601–02 (2010); see also Richard M. Re, The
Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313, 329–30 (2016) (arguing that a positive law
model would tend to devalue minority rights).
256
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straightforward issues that lower courts regularly confront are underrepresented on the Supreme Court’s docket, these results inevitably understate the degree to which clear declarations on the Fourth
Amendment’s requirements have allowed lower courts routinely to reach
uncontroversially correct conclusions.
Moreover, the performance of lower courts on Fourth Amendment
issues is roughly equivalent to the performance of lower courts in general, as evidenced by comparison to other studies that have tracked the
performance of federal courts of appeals for other purposes. In addition
to this, Fourth Amendment cases make up a small portion not only of the
Court’s overall docket, but also of its criminal procedure docket. The
Court also does not appear to feel compelled to review Fourth Amendment issues at a rate dramatically disproportionate to the rate at which it
addresses other important, discrete constitutional questions.
For all of the reasons I have described above, this Study can provide
only a coarse estimate of the relative coherence of Fourth Amendment
law. The results, however, make far more plausible than the scholarly
consensus would suggest the notion that the Supreme Court is already
giving sufficiently clear direction to lower courts for those courts to
reach consistent, correct results most of the time. For those motivated
primarily by perceived incoherence in Fourth Amendment law to devise
majestic new interpretive schemes, the Study provides a basis for qualified skepticism of the necessity of such theoretical novelties. Finally, for
one interested in enhancing the coherence of Fourth Amendment law, the
results give some indication that the Court should issue bright-line rules
in Fourth Amendment cases if it hopes to increase the odds of lower
courts reaching the right answers when they confront Fourth Amendment
questions in the future.

